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Professor Bruce Ackerman’s new book, Revolutionary Constitutions: 
Charismatic Leadership and the Rule of Law,1 Volume I, is a monumental 
contribution to the nascent field of Comparative Constitutional Law.  It is the 
best and only theoretical treatment of the subject it covers, and the book 
contains an enormous amount of new research and writings in English of the 
countries it covers which include: India, South Africa, Italy, France, Poland, 
Israel, Myanmar, and Iran.  It is an invaluable contribution to the field and an 
exemplary work of scholarship. 
Professor Ackerman’s book explains how twentieth century revolutions in 
the countries he studies led to the constitutionalization of charisma—
borrowing the terminology of Max Weber.  Ackerman explains that 
revolutionary leaders in the countries he discusses in Volume I chose to write 
constitutions, thus making permanent the charismatic power that they had at 
Time 1 as revolutionaries.  He then notes that actors much later on at Time 2 in 
those countries were bound and controlled by the written constitutions that 
revolutionary leaders had entrenched at Time 1. 
Professor Ackerman argues that there are three separate paths that modern 
constitutions have followed since 1945.  The first path, which is the sole path 
discussed in Volume I, is the mobilization of a mass movement party by a 
charismatic leader who leads a charismatic mass movement to overthrow the 
prior undemocratic and repressive regime and to institute a new regime 
whereby the charismatic leader constitutionalizes and makes enduring his and 
his movement’s charisma.  The second path, which will be discussed in 
Volume II, occurs when powerful elites construct a constitution at Time 1, as 
happened in Japan and West Germany after World War II, and that elite-
written constitution then becomes an enduring document, which people follow 
and which has legitimacy at Time 2.  The third path, which will be discussed in 
Volume III, occurs when a constitution evolves over a long period of time at 
Time 1, which has happened in the United Kingdom, in Canada, and in 
Australia.  These constitutions are followed and enjoy legitimacy at Time 2 in 
those respective countries. 
I agree with everything that Professor Ackerman says in Revolutionary 
Constitutions:  Charismatic Leadership and the Rule of Law, Volume I, but I 
would add to Professor Ackerman’s work a very important caveat, which is 
that world constitutionalism existed in the nineteenth century and in the 
twentieth century prior to 1945.  What is really striking, in my opinion, about 
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the post-1945 experience is that the constitutionalization of charisma included 
not only the adoption of written constitutions, but also the adoption, in the 
countries Professor Ackerman discusses, of meaningful systems of judicial 
review and of checks and balances.  In 1945, only three countries in the 
world—the United States, Canada, and Australia—had judicial review of the 
constitutionality of national legislation and a working system of checks and 
balances.2  In 1945, the United States was the only nation in the world with a 
Bill of Rights enforced by judicial review.  Today, all of the countries which 
Professor Ackerman discusses in Volume I have not only a written constitution 
but also: 1) a powerful system of judicial review; 2) a Bill of Rights; and 3) a 
meaningful system of checks and balances.  In Part I, below, I will discuss how 
the phenomenon of written constitutionalism was widespread in the world 
during the nineteenth century and during the twentieth century up until 1945.  
In Part II, I will discuss how all of Professor Ackerman’s revolutionary leaders 
set up: 1) systems of judicial review, and 2) systems of checks and balances.  
In Part III, I will discuss what caused judicial review to originate and grow in 
the fifteen of the G-20 Nations, which are constitutional democracies and 
which Professor Ackerman does not discuss in Revolutionary Constitutions.  In 
doing this, I will be summarizing the findings of my own two volume book 
series entitled The History and Growth of Judicial Review in the G-20 
Constitutional Democracies, which will be forthcoming with Oxford 
University Press in 2021. 
I.  WRITTEN CONSTITUTIONS PRIOR TO 1945 
Written constitutions were commonplace prior to 1945 even though judicial 
review of federal legislation for constitutionality existed only in the United 
States, Canada, and Australia.  I will discuss below the experience with written 
constitutions in: 1) the United States; 2) continental Europe; 3) Asia; 4) Latin 
America; and 5) the British Empire between 1776 and 1945. 
A.  The United States 
The first written constitutions in the world were the state constitutions of 
eleven of the thirteen original states of the United States, which declared their 
independence from the United Kingdom in the U.S. Declaration of 
Independence of July 4, 1776.  These state constitutions were written and 
ratified between 1776 and 1787, and they were inspired in part by the written 
colonial charters, which those states had been governed under when they were 
British colonies, and in part by the Lockean idea that men should set up a 
government through a written social contract.  Strikingly, most of the eleven 
states that wrote state constitutions also wrote state declarations of rights that 
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judicial review of cantonal but not federal laws.  Switzerland has also had since the nineteenth 
century a working system of checks and balances. 
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were far more libertarian and comprehensive than the so-called English Bill of 
Rights of 1689.  These declarations of rights were inspired by the colonists’ 
religious sentiments, by the thinkers of the Enlightenment, and by a desire to 
prevent certain wrongs that the British had committed in the American 
colonies from ever happening again. 
The thirteen American colonies had, from the founding of the Jamestown 
colony in 1607, up until the American Declaration of Independence in 1776, 
been subject to judicial review by the king of England’s Privy Council—an 
elite, small number of English lords.  These lords were chosen by the king of 
England to judicially review all English colonial laws to make certain they 
were not repugnant to, but were consistent with, the laws of England, to the 
extent colonial laws diverged from the laws of England.3  As a result of Privy 
Council judicial review, the thirteen American colonies became accustomed to 
having some of their laws struck down for exceeding the scope of the powers 
delegated to the American colonies by their colonial charters.  In 1776, 
Americans disliked judicial power, which they associated with British imperial 
rule.  But, Americans gave state judges life tenure when they wrote their new 
state constitutions in 1776.  By 1787, Americans were furious with their all-
powerful state legislatures, and they supported judicial review of the 
constitutionality of laws two decades prior to the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
decision in Marbury v. Madison.4 
The original thirteen states thus originated both: 1) the idea of the central 
importance of a written constitution and bill of rights; and 2) the additional 
idea that a court could enforce such a written constitution as supreme law by 
striking down a legislative enactment or an executive action taken by a co-
equal legislative or executive branch of that state’s government.  The first idea 
about the centrality of written constitutions swept across the globe immediately 
from 1789 onward.5  The second idea, about the courts having the power to 
judicially review legislative acts of a co-equal branch of government, did not 
become commonplace until well after 1945.6 
The eleven original written state constitutions, which were written between 
1776 and 1787, were soon followed by a written federal constitution called the 
Articles of Confederation, which set up an extremely weak federal government 
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for the thirteen rebellious states.  That federal government won the American 
War of Independence, and it signed a peace treaty with the United Kingdom in 
1783, in which the U.K. recognized American independence and ceded any 
claims it had to land in the areas that would eventually become the states of 
Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, and Michigan.  The federal government under the 
Articles of Confederation proved to be too weak because: 1) it had no power to 
regulate internal and external commerce; 2) it had no power to assess taxes or 
directly regulate American citizens; and 3) it was only amendable by 
unanimous consent, which could not be obtained because, for example, tiny 
Rhode Island vetoed an amendment passed by the other twelve states to give 
the Continental Congress the power to regulate internal and external 
commerce. 
As a result, a federal Constitutional Convention was held in Philadelphia, 
Pennsylvania, in 1787, which wrote the current Constitution of the United 
States.  The new constitution created: 1) a much more powerful federal 
government; 2) a Madisonian system of checks and balances to prevent that 
new, more powerful, federal government from abusing power; 3) a system of 
judicial review by the federal and state courts of the constitutionality of both 
congressional and presidential actions; and 4) a much easier amendment 
process than the one in the Articles of Confederation.  This written federal 
constitution went into effect on March 4, 1789.  In 1791, a written federal bill 
of rights was added to the U.S. Constitution to address the concerns of those 
who had opposed the ratification of the new constitution out of fear that it 
would make the national government too powerful.  This bill of rights was 
largely copied not from the English Bill of Rights of 1689, but rather from the 
post-1776 state declarations of rights, which were much more libertarian than 
were any English constitutional documents. 
The written U.S. Constitution and Bill of Rights were amended seventeen 
times between 1791 and 2018 in critically important ways, especially by the 
three Reconstruction Constitutional Amendments, which were adopted after 
the Civil War between 1865 and 1870, and by the Progressive Constitutional 
Amendments, which were adopted between 1913 and 1920.  The Progressive 
Amendments approved the national government’s power to tax income; 
provided for the direct popular election of U.S. senators; and gave women the 
right to vote.  Other important constitutional amendments since 1920 have 
limited the president to two four year terms and have expanded the suffrage 
further. 
The written U.S. Constitution, which went into effect in 1789, inspired a 
wave of constitutionalists all over the world, adopting for their own countries 
written constitutions.  Unfortunately, prior to 1945, no country in the world 
adopted a written constitution with: 1) a powerful system of judicial review of 
the constitutionality of national legislative and presidential acts or 2) a 
meaningful system of checks and balances.  As a result, all of the written 
constitutions inspired by the U.S. example from 1789 to 1945 ended in failure 
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except for the Canadian Constitution Act of 1867, the Australian Constitution 
Act of 1901, and the Swiss Constitution of 1874.  The plagiarists in other 
countries who copied the U.S. written constitution of 1789 did a poor job of 
plagiarizing when it came to judicial review and checks and balances. 
B.  The Continental European Experience Prior to 1945 
The continental European experience with written constitutionalism began 
with the French Revolution.  The French revolutionaries adopted a written 
constitution in 1791, which was the first written constitution ever in that 
country.  It adopted the principle of popular sovereignty and the idea of written 
constitutionalism.  The 1791 Constitution, in turn, was built on a written 1789 
Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, which became in 1971 a 
judicially enforceable part of French constitutional law.  The Declaration of the 
Rights of Man and of the Citizen of 1789 was inspired by the American state 
declarations of rights adopted between 1776 and 1789, which were translated 
into French and popularized by Benjamin Franklin and Thomas Jefferson, both 
of whom spent large periods of time in Paris in the 1770s and 1780s.7 
The French Revolutionary Constitution of 1791 was reluctantly accepted by 
King Louis XVI.  This constitution provided for a separation of powers among 
the legislative, executive, and judicial powers, although the courts did not have 
the power of judicial review.  When France went to war with the United 
Kingdom, an insurrection occurred, which led to a national convention being 
called, which declared France to be a Republic under a dictatorship of the 
radical French revolutionaries Robespierre, Danton, Marat, and the Paris 
Commune.  This marked the end of the first French Constitution. 
Also in 1791, in continental Europe, the country of Poland adopted a written 
constitution, inspired by the U.S. Constitution, which went into effect on May 
3rd.  This liberal document inspired enmity from Poland’s monarchical and 
imperial neighbors: 1) Russia, 2) Austria-Hungary, and 3) Prussia.  By 1795, 
those three neighboring countries reapportioned all of Poland by seizing all 
Polish land for themselves.  Poland thus ceased to exist as a sovereign nation 
state, and its written Constitution of 1791 thus ceased to be governing law after 
1795. 
From the 1790’s until 1815, continental Europe was in an almost constant 
state of war, first with revolutionary France and then with the French 
revolutionary dictator, Napoleon Bonaparte.  Napoleon conquered the 
countries of Spain and Portugal, and the Portuguese ruling monarch fled to 
Brazil, which he governed until 1815.  After Napoleon’s final defeat at the 
Battle of Waterloo, the European Monarchies gathered at the Congress of 
Vienna, determined to stamp out democracy, classical liberalism, and written 
constitutionalism while restoring feudalism and monarchy.  Metternich and the 
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Congress of Vienna prevailed from 1815 until 1830 in imposing a weak 
Bourbon monarchy on France, but, in the July Revolution of 1830, the French 
demanded that a weak constitutional monarch, Louis Philippe I govern them 
instead of his cousin Charles X who was the rightful holder of the French 
throne.  Also, in 1830, the Belgians rebelled against the Netherlands, and 
Belgium became an independent country from that time on with a 
constitutional monarchy like Britain’s and like France under Louis Philippe.  
Belgium adopted a written constitution at this time. 
The next major impetus for written constitutionalism came with the 
Revolutions of 1848, which toppled monarchies all over Europe.  These 
revolutions were all liberal and democratic in nature, and the revolutionaries 
typically demanded and received written constitutions.  The February 
Revolution of 1848 in France led to the replacement of the constitutional 
monarch, King Louis Philippe, with the French Second Republic.  All the 
people of France elected a constituent assembly, which adopted a new written 
constitution on November 4, 1848. 
Under this constitution, there was to be a separate legislature called the 
assembly and a separately-elected president, who would serve a term of four 
years with universal male suffrage.  No provision was made for either judicial 
review or for checks and balances like: 1) the holding of midterm elections; 2) 
the creation of regional power centers to offset central power; or 3) the creation 
of powerful legislative oversight committees with subpoena power.  On 
December 10, 1948, the French stupidly elected Louis-Napoleon, the first 
Napoleon’s nephew, to be the new President of France.  In 1851, Louis-
Napoleon overthrew France’s second written constitution, and he established 
himself as Napoleon III, emperor and liberal dictator of France. 
In Italy, the Revolutions of 1848 led to the brief creation of an independent 
state in Sicily with a written constitution, and it led to the king of Piedmont, 
Savoy, and Sardinia agreeing to a written constitution as well, called the 
Statuto Albertino after King Charles Albert who had proclaimed it.  The 
Statuto Albertino became the constitution of all of Italy once the Italian nation 
state was created during the 1860s.  The Statuto was a written constitution, 
which was interpreted by the legislature when it passed laws, and it did not 
give the courts any power of judicial review.  It was thus very much like the 
first and second French Constitutions, which were also written documents that 
did not give the courts the power of judicial review and which did not set up 
meaningful separations of power. 
The Revolutions of 1848 in March of that year occurred in the south and in 
the west of Germany.  The revolutionaries demanded German unification; 
freedom of speech and of the press; and, in 1849, a Frankfurt Convention 
named a document the written constitution of the German Empire.  The 
Frankfurt Constitution was a written constitution, which did not contemplate 
modern style judicial review of the constitutionality of federal legislation or a 
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Madisonian system of checks and balances.  King Frederick William of Prussia 
was to be the constitutional monarch of this regime, a role he refused to play. 
Ultimately, in 1871, Germany was unified as an empire after it defeated 
France in the Franco-Prussian War.  Bismarck, who advised the Prussian 
Monarch on all things, designed a written constitution of the German Empire, 
which did go into effect in 1871 as the constitution of all of Germany.  The 
German Imperial Constitution created a bicameral legislature with the lower 
house representing the German people and the upper house representing the 
historical German states of which Prussia was by far the largest and most 
populous.  All power was vested in the emperor and in the upper house of the 
legislature, and there was no provision for judicial review and no self-
conscious effort to create a system of checks and balances. 
The German Imperial Constitution worked well when Bismarck was in 
power, but when Bismarck was sidelined by the new kaiser, Wilhelm II, the 
stage was set for a catastrophe.  Wilhelm adopted a new and bellicose 
approach to foreign policy, which ultimately led to World War I, and the 
overthrowing of the German monarchy.  World War I destroyed many of the 
brightest and best minds of Germany, France, and the United Kingdom.  It led 
to the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917 in Russia and to the splintering of the 
Austro-Hungarian Empire into what are now roughly a dozen separate nation 
states, all of them badly governed down to the present day. 
Meanwhile, in France, Emperor Napoleon III was deposed after France was 
crushed by Prussia in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71.  Initially, there was 
some confusion about what form of government France should opt for after 
1871, but, by 1875, a third written French constitution was put in place by 
legislation, which provided for a popularly elected Chamber of Deputies and a 
much weaker upper house called the Senate, with a ceremonial president to 
serve as head of state.  Political parties formed in the Chamber of Deputies and 
elected by 1877 committed opponents of monarchy to all chief offices.  The 
Third Republic became famous for its prime ministers and coalition 
governments produced by a radical electoral law using proportional 
representation.  Strong executive power was in disgrace after two failed 
Napoleonic Empires and a failed Bourbon monarchy.  The Constitution of the 
Third Republic did not provide for judicial review of the constitutionality of 
national legislation nor did it have any meaningful system of checks and 
balances.  It ushered in an age of weak classical liberal governments that 
would not have survived to win World War I without British and U.S. military 
help. 
In 1919, a militarily defeated Germany adopted the Weimar Constitution, 
which served as Germany’s governing document until the rise to power of 
Adolf Hitler and the Nazis in 1933.  The Weimar Constitution was yet another 
in a by now long string of continental European constitutions which did not 
provide for meaningful judicial review of federal legislation; did not contain a 
strong Madisonian system of checks and balances; allowed for extreme 
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proportional representation, which made the all powerful lower house of the 
legislature unmanageable; and which created a president with: 1) much too 
long a term; 2) the power to rule by emergency decree; 3) no need to worry 
about powerful state governors, midterm elections, or legislative oversight 
committees armed with subpoena power; and 4) no moderating national two 
party system.  The result was that the Weimar Constitution failed utterly in that 
the second and last president of the Republic was not really a believer in 
democracy, and a series of bizarre events led to the election of the notorious 
criminal Adolf Hitler as the chancellor or prime minister of Germany.  Hitler 
asked Parliament to delegate all of its legislative and constitutional powers to 
him and to his cabinet, and in the Enabling Act of March 23, 1933, Parliament 
complied. 
Meanwhile, in Italy, Benito Mussolini came to power in 1922 due to 
misbehavior by the King of Italy, and within five years he had turned himself 
into the sole Fascist dictator of Italy.  The classical liberal written constitution 
known as the Statuto Albertino proved to be no barrier to Italian fascism 
because the Statuto was enforced by the legislature, which Mussolini 
controlled.  There was in the Statuto Albertino no Madisonian system of 
checks and balances and no independent judicial review of the constitutionality 
of national legislative and executive acts.  The Statuto Albertino was thus as 
ineffectual as the first and second French constitutions and the Constitution of 
the Weimar Republic in preventing a descent into authoritarian rule. 
The final proof that there was a “rise of world constitutionalism” in Europe 
prior to 1945 came with the adoption by Joseph Stalin, the brutal dictator of the 
totalitarian Soviet Union, of his 1936 written constitution for the Soviet Union.  
This written document guaranteed the freedom of speech and of the press, the 
free exercise of religion, and protection from warrantless searches and seizures 
as well as guaranteeing such second generation constitutional rights as the right 
to a job and to health care.  The Stalin written Constitution of 1936 was 
obviously not worth the paper it was written on because it was a propaganda 
tool that was not followed at all in Stalin’s Soviet Union.  The Stalin 
Constitution, of course, set up no independent system of judicial review of the 
constitutionality of federal legislation in the U.S.S.R. or of Stalin’s executive 
orders.  The Stalin Constitution also set up no working system of Madisonian 
checks and balances.  It therefore proves that what is distinctive about the post-
1945 experience of constitutionalism is not the written constitutionalization of 
charisma, which Professor Ackerman writes about, but is instead the written 
constitutionalization of judicial review of federal legislation, of federal 
executive actions, and of a Madisonian system of checks and balances. 
Many of the continental European constitutions involved charismatic leaders 
like Bismarck in Germany, the founders of the French Third Republic in 
France in 1875, or Stalin in the U.S.S.R., constitutionalizing their charisma in a 
written constitution.  These constitutions all failed, however, because they did 
not provide for a Madisonian system of checks and balances and judicial 
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review of the constitutionality of federal legislation.  Some written 
constitutions, like the Constitution of the French Third Republic, did not set up 
a powerful enough government to fight off the rise of Hitler’s military power 
from 1933 to 1939.  France was powerful enough in 1933 to stop Hitler’s 
rebuilding of the German military on its own, but the weak leaders of the Third 
Republic failed to act militarily against Hitler in 1933 when they could easily 
have won.  When France did act militarily in 1939, it was too weak to stop 
Hitler and it was conquered, and the Third Republic was overthrown. 
The only continental European constitution which did not degenerate into a 
tyranny, and which was not overthrown by Hitler and Mussolini, was the Swiss 
written Constitution of 1874, which borrowed heavily from the U.S. 
Constitution of 1787.  The Swiss Constitution set up a strongly federal system 
of what are, today twenty-six cantons, with a bicameral federal legislature.  
The cantons are equally represented in the upper house while representation in 
the lower house is based on population.  There is a multi-member federal 
executive committee, and an independent judiciary, which can hold cantonal 
laws unconstitutional but not federal laws.  In addition, there is ample 
provision made for the holding of popular referenda and initiatives. 
The Swiss Constitution creates a system of dual federalism that is more 
federalist than is the U.S. system, and it divides power among a bicameral 
legislature and three co-equal branches of the national government.  The Swiss 
courts can hold cantonal but not federal laws to be unconstitutional.  The Swiss 
Constitution has survived because it provides for a Madisonian system of 
checks and balances and for some judicial review of the constitutionality of 
legislation.  The Swiss Constitution was updated in 1999, but it retains all of its 
checks and balances features. 
C.  The Asian Experience Prior to 1945 
The Asian country of Japan was the first country on that continent to 
experiment with written constitutionalism, a concept which it borrowed from 
continental Europe and from the United States.  In 1889, the Meiji Emperor of 
Japan, who was an absolute dictator, promulgated the Meiji Constitution of 
Japan, which governed that country from November 29, 1890 until May 2, 
1947.  The Meiji Constitution provided for a form of mixed constitutionalism 
coupled with absolute monarchy.  It was deliberately modeled on Bismarck’s 
Constitution of the German Empire, which was in effect in 1890 when the 
Meiji Constitution went into effect.  It could be said that, by promulgating the 
Meiji Constitution, the Meiji emperor constitutionalized his charisma in 
Professor Ackerman’s terms. 
The Meiji Constitution provided for a parliamentary government in Japan 
with an elected lower house of parliament, which in turn elected a prime 
minister who was the head of the government.  The emperor of Japan was the 
ceremonial head of state, and he was above the law of the Meiji Constitution.  
It also created an independent judiciary with no power of judicial review.  
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There was a bicameral legislature with a popularly elected lower house and an 
upper house of peers, which resembled the British House of Lords.  
Sovereignty resided in the emperor and not in the people of Japan.  The 
document did strikingly contain a qualified bill of rights as well as a citizens’ 
bill of duties.  The emperor had the sole right to declare war and peace and 
could dissolve the lower house at any time and call for new elections.  The 
lower house was elected by all male Japanese citizens who owned a small 
amount of property.  In 1910, Japan invaded and annexed the county of Korea. 
The 1919 Treaty of Versailles, which ended World War I, did not recognize 
various Japanese territorial claims, and it led to an ardent growth of militarism 
and later of fascism in Japan.  In the 1920s, Japan embarked on a major 
program of building up its navy and, by the 1930s, fascists came to power in 
the government of Japan.  Japan eventually invaded China and Manchuria.  
The invasion of China began on July 7, 1937.  President Franklin D. Roosevelt 
responded to Japanese aggression in China by ending U.S. oil shipments to 
Japan, which left that country very dependent on other Asian oil-producing 
countries and on oil imported from the Middle East.  Japan did not control the 
sea lanes to the Middle East.  As a result, FDR’s embargo on U.S. oil 
shipments to Japan was a major cause of the fascist government of Japan’s 
military attack on the U.S. fleet in Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, where it was head-
quartered. 
In any event, the written Meiji Constitution of Japan, which contained no 
Madisonian systems of checks and balances and no judicial review of the 
constitutionality of legislation was easily subverted into a fascist regime.  That 
fascist regime launched the military attack on Pearl Harbor, which brought the 
U.S. into World War II.  Japan by then had allied itself with Hitler’s Germany 
and Mussolini’s Italy.  After the U.S. declared war on Japan following Pearl 
Harbor, Nazi Germany declared war on the United States allowing FDR to 
come finally to the rescue of the British who were being besieged by the Nazis 
and with whom FDR was eager to be allied militarily. 
In 1912, Sun Yat-sen overthrew the Emperor of China and established a 
democratic republic on the mainland of China.  Also in 1912, a written 
Provisional Constitution of the Republic of China was drawn up and put into 
legal effect.  This document governed the Republic of China until 1928, and it 
provided for a parliamentary system of government headed by a weak 
president.  Sun Yat-sen was president of China for two months in 1912, and he 
was premier of the Kuomintang Party from 1919 to 1925, when he died. 
In 1916, China descended into a state of chaos, which ended in 1928 when 
the Kuomintang Party, under Chiang Kai-shek, established its control over all 
of China.  The Kuomintang Party promulgated a written Provisional 
Constitution of the Political Tutelage Period on May 5, 1931.  Under this 
document, the Kuomintang Party operated as a one party system with complete 
control over mainland China.  On December 25, 1947, the Kuomintang Party 
agreed with the Chinese Communist Party on a written constitution for 
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mainland China, but the communists boycotted the subsequent government.  
By 1949, the Kuomintang Party had been expelled from the Chinese mainland 
by Mao Ze Dong and governed only the island of Taiwan.  The 1947 
Constitution was thus only in effect on Taiwan after 1949. 
In Asia, as in continental Europe, governments in Japan and China 
constitutionalized their charisma in a written constitution without a Madisonian 
system of checks and balances and without judicial review of the 
constitutionality of legislation.  These written constitutions in pre-1945 Japan 
and China both failed and devolved into authoritarian rule. 
D.  The Latin American Experience Prior to 1988 
As a result of the Napoleonic Wars, the Portuguese ruling monarch fled to 
Brazil, which he governed until 1815 when he returned to Portugal leaving his 
son behind to act as regent in Brazil.  The son declared Brazil independent of 
Portugal in 1822, and he declared himself to be the emperor of Brazil with the 
title Dom Pedro I.  Sixteen days later, Dom Pedro I set in motion a process 
under which Brazil adopted its first imperial written constitution.  This 
constitution recognized four powers of government: the legislative, executive, 
judicial, and moderating powers.  The emperor held both the executive and the 
moderating power, and he also appointed the upper house of the Brazilian 
legislature.  This written undemocratic constitution remained in place until the 
emperor was overthrown in 1889, and the Constitution of the Old Republic of 
1891 was adopted.  That document was a virtual copy of the U.S. Constitution, 
but without the safeguards against presidential power afforded by the U.S. 
Constitution, as I will explain further below. 
Meanwhile, in 1808, with the Spanish monarchy in exile, Simon Bolivar led 
a campaign for independence in the Spanish-speaking parts of South America, 
which began in Venezuela and which spread from there to Columbia, Bolivia 
(which is named after Bolivar), Ecuador, Peru, and Panama.  Venezuela 
achieved de facto independence from Spain in 1810-1813, it was recaptured by 
Spain, but became independent again in 1819.  Bolivar went on to conquer 
Spanish forces in Columbia, Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru, and Panama.  The 
independence of these countries was consolidated between 1825 and 1830.  He 
wrote a “Bolivian Constitution,” which copied the U.S. Constitution’s 
separation of powers, but which created an all-powerful national government 
and an all-powerful President—Simon Bolivar.  Simon Bolivar thus, in 
Professor Ackerman’s terminology “constitutionalized his charisma.”  In 1830, 
Bolivar died, and his empire disintegrated into the modern day centralized 
nation states of: Venezuela, Columbia, Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru, and Panama.  
Most of these countries were government by popular strongmen—caudillos—
who called themselves presidents, mimicking the U.S. Constitution. 
Mexico became independent of Spain in 1821, and it adopted its most recent 
written constitution in 1917, which is modeled on the U.S. Constitution, 
creating three branches of the national government and independent, self-
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governing states.  In practice, however, since the Mexican Constitution of 1917 
did not provide for midterm elections and since it gave the President a non-
renewable six year term, Mexico was a presidential dictatorship under the 
control of the Institutional Revolutionary Party until the end of the 1990s.  
Mexico had a written constitution from 1917 on, but it only became a 
democratic republic in the last twenty years. 
Brazil became independent of Portugal in 1822, as a constitutional monarchy 
with an emperor who was all-powerful.  Brazil adopted seven written 
constitutions—all modeled disastrously on the U.S. Constitution—between 
1824 and the adoption of the current eighth democratic constitution of Brazil in 
1988.  In the 1824 Constitution of the Brazilian Empire, Emperor Dom Pedro I 
constitutionalized his charisma.  The Brazilian empire was abolished in 1889, 
following a military coup d’etat, and the country was a presidential 
dictatorship for most of its history.  As with Mexico, Brazil copied the U.S. 
Constitution’s federalism and separation of legislative, executive, and judicial 
power.  Brazil did not, however, copy the U.S. practice of holding midterm 
elections every two years; it had much weaker state governments than did the 
U.S.; it did not develop congressional oversight committees with subpoena 
power; and judicial review did not work in Brazil because, as a civil law 
country, Brazil’s lower courts would not follow judicial review precedents 
arrived at by the Supreme Federal Tribunal.  Thus, from the end of the Empire 
in 1889, to the adoption of the current democratic written Constitution of 1988, 
Brazil was ruled either by a presidential dictator or by military strongmen who 
seized power in various coups d’etat.  Written constitutionalism was tried in 
Brazil, as it was tried in Mexico and by Simon Bolivar, but due to the selective 
copying of the U.S. Constitution, the Latin American written constitutions of 
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries did not produce democracy until long 
after 1945. 
Argentina became independent of Spain in 1818, but it descended into a 
series of civil wars, which ravaged the country until 1861.  Written 
constitutions based on the U.S. Constitution were produced and failed in 1819 
and in 1826.  Eventually, between 1853 and 1866, a permanent written 
constitution, based on the U.S. Constitution, with a separation of powers and 
meaningful federalism was established.  Argentina flourished between 1866 
and 1939 as waves of educated European immigrants settled there.  
Unfortunately, Argentina did not copy the U.S. system of midterm elections; it 
did not have powerful legislative oversight committees; and it did not have a 
meaningful system of judicial review because precedent was not binding in the 
country, which was a civil law jurisdiction.  Partly as a result, Juan Peron was 
elected president of Argentina from 1946 to 1955, and again from 1973 to 
1974.  Peron turned the country into a presidential dictatorship along with his 
wife Eva Duarte.  In between the Peron presidencies, there was a military coup 
d’etat, and Peronism became a form of fascism in Argentina.  After Peron’s 
death, there followed yet another brutal military dictatorship. 
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Argentina, today, has a written constitution, which was amended in 1898, 
1949 by Peron, 1957, and finally becoming the current democratic written 
Constitution of 1994.  Since 1994, Argentina has been governed by a series of 
strongmen presidents, some from a Peronist party and some from the 
opposition.  All of these presidents, except for the two most recent presidents, 
began their tenures by firing or impeaching all Supreme Court justices 
appointed by their predecessors.  President Macri broke with that practice in 
2015, but it will take one or two more successor presidents not firing the 
Supreme Court before one could say with any confidence that Argentina is 
again a constitutional democracy. 
Finally, the Latin American country of Chile became independent of Spain 
in 1818 and was an authoritarian country until 1891 when a written 
constitution redistributed power between the president and congress, creating a 
parliamentary style democracy.  There was a period of military rule from 1924 
to 1932, but, from 1932 until 1973, Chile was a stable constitutional 
democracy until the United States, under the disgraceful rule of President 
Richard M. Nixon, overthrew the socialist government of Salvador Allende.  
Chile was governed by a brutal military dictator, Augusto Pinochet, until a new 
president was elected in 1988.  Chile became a presidential, separation of 
powers regime under Pinochet, and its written constitution today follows that 
model.  Chile has been a constitutional democracy for the last thirty years. 
In sum, Latin America had written constitutions in which Simon Bolivar and 
the Brazilian emperor Dom Pedro I constitutionalized their charisma, but these 
written constitutions all failed to survive even though they were all modeled on 
the U.S. Constitution.  These constitutions failed because they did not copy the 
Madisonian system of checks and balances with: 1) midterm elections to the 
legislature; 2) territorial legislative districts with a first-past-the-post electoral 
system, as opposed to proportional representation; 3) powerful legislative 
oversight committees armed with subpoena power; 4) judicial review by life 
tenured judges of federal legislative and executive acts; and 5) powerful state 
governors elected during the midterm year when the party in control of the 
executive branch always loses elections.  The problem with the Latin 
American plagiarists of the U.S. Constitution was not that they set up 
presidential, separation of powers systems as Professors Juan Linz and Bruce 
Ackerman have claimed.  The problem is that the Latin American plagiarists 
failed to plagiarize critical aspects of the U.S. constitutional system, which 
check and balance presidential power. 
E.  The Countries of the British Empire from 1607 to 1945 
We saw above in Section A that the thirteen original American states 
adopted systems of judicial review of the constitutionality of legislation from 
their colonial experience of being subjected to judicial review of the legality of 
their colonial laws by the Privy Council to the King of England.  The same 
process was at work in the British Empire, especially after the Privy Council 
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was reformed and modernized in 1833.  The 1833 reforms were written by the 
great Whig reformer, Lord Brougham, who also shepherded the 1832 electoral 
reforms through Parliament, eliminating the rotten boroughs, and who led the 
successful effort to abolish slavery in the British Empire in 1833. 
Lord Brougham secured the passage of the Judicial Committee of the Privy 
Council Act of 1833 by the imperial British Parliament, which reformed the 
Privy Council in the following ways.  First, the 1833 Act provided that only 
highly experienced barristers who were law lords could sit on the Judicial 
Committee of the Privy Council (JCPC).  Second, the 1833 Act provided that 
there should always be experts on the civil law, Islamic law, and Hindu law on 
the JCPC who could knowledgeably decide cases involving these other non-
British common law legal cases.  Third, the 1833 Act specified that retired 
colonial judges with expertise in native law could hear cases involving such 
law.  Fourth, the 1833 Act provided that the Judicial Committee should deliver 
only one per curiam opinion with no concurrences or dissents allowed.  Fifth, 
and finally, the 1833 Act made it clear that the decisions of the JCPC were 
binding upon his majesty the king who had to approve them without altering 
them in any way.  These reforms transformed the Privy Council into a high 
power Supreme Court of the British Empire, which had the last word on the 
constitutionality of national and provincial or state laws enacted under the 
Canadian Constitution Act of 1867; the Australian Constitution Act of 1901; 
the South African Constitution Act of 1910; and the Government of India Act 
of 1935.8 
From 1833 until 1945, the JCPC heard and decided thousands of cases from: 
Canada, British India, Australia, South Africa, and Palestine, once it became a 
British Mandate.9  The JCPC had a permanent impact on the constitutional law 
of all of the countries for which it served as a final court of appeals.  For 
example, in Canada, the renowned Canadian legal scholar Peter W. Hogg 
explains that the JCPC left a permanent imprint on Canadian federalism by 
interpreting the powers of Canada’s provinces much more broadly and the 
powers of Canada’s national government much more narrowly than a 
reasonable reading of the Canadian Constitution Act of 1867 would have 
suggested.10  Professor Hogg’s book chapter makes it clear that Canada 
inherited not only the written Constitution Act of 1867 from the United 
Kingdom, but also, ironically, the idea of federalism and separation of powers 
judicial review of the constitutionality of national legislation.  This is ironic 
because the United Kingdom, itself, did not have judicial review of acts of 
Parliament or the monarch, but the U.K. exported that idea to the thirteen 
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original American colonies, to Canada, and to every other part of its empire, 
which at its zenith encompassed one-quarter of the whole world.  It was said at 
the time that the sun never set on the British Empire. 
Australia also inherited the idea of a written Constitution and of judicial 
review of both federal and state legislation, as well as executive branch 
actions, from the United Kingdom.  The Australian Constitution Act of 1901, 
which is Australia’s written Constitution, was, like the Canadian Constitution 
Act of 1867, originally a statute written by the imperial British Parliament.  
Both acts delimit federal and state/provincial enumerated powers and impose a 
separation of judicial power from the fused parliamentary executive-legislative 
entities, which they create.  Australia’s Constitution has no bill of rights 
whereas Canada added the Charter of Rights and Freedoms to its Constitution 
in 1982, when the British Parliament finally terminated its power to legislate 
for Canada.  Queen Elizabeth II remains the Queen of both Canada and of 
Australia, although she is represented as head of state by Canadian and 
Australian picked Governors General. 
Australia has traditionally interpreted its constitution in a very formal and 
literal way because that is how the British courts and the Privy Council 
interpreted legislation and constitutions from 1920 on.11  Australia thus, like 
Canada and the United States, inherited both the idea of a paramount written 
constitution and the idea of federalism and separation of powers judicial 
review of the constitutionality of federal legislation from the United Kingdom.  
Again, this outcome is ironic because the United Kingdom, itself, has no 
written constitution and only since the Human Rights Act, 1998  has the U.K. 
had judicial review of the constitutionality of acts of the U.K. parliament. 
India also inherited the idea of a written judicially enforced federal 
constitution from the U.K.’s Privy Council experience.  The framers of the 
Constitution of India, however, made it clear that they wanted to depart from 
the so-called Westminster Parliamentary Sovereignty model by adopting a 
U.S.-style bill of rights that would be enforced by the courts of India against 
both the federal and state governments, acting either through their legislatures 
or their executives.  Initially, the Supreme Court of India behaved very 
cautiously, but as I will explain further below, after the Indira Gandhi state of 
emergency, the Supreme Court of India became very activist.12  India had 
extensive experience from 1833 to 1947 with JCPC judicial review of the 
constitutionality of its laws.13 
South Africa also had a limited experience with JCPC constitutional review 
of its laws from 1910 to the adoption of the Statute of Westminster in 1931.  
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South Africa terminated Privy Council review of its laws upon obtaining its 
independence, and, under the post-1948 apartheid regime, South Africa had no 
judicial review of the constitutionality of legislation and no bill of rights, 
having opted for the Parliamentary Sovereignty U.K. model.  I will discuss the 
recent experience in South Africa below. 
Finally, Palestine, which included Israel, Jordan, and the Gaza strip, was 
subject to JCPC judicial review from 1923 to May 15, 1948, when the state of 
Israel declared its independence.14  Aharon Barak, a former president of the 
Supreme Court of Israel and a renowned legal scholar, has told me that this 
common law period in Israel’s pre-independence history had a profound effect 
on the high status of Israeli judges and made it more feasible for him to 
introduce judicial review of the constitutionality of Israeli legislation in the 
1990s.  In Israel, as in several other countries, the U.K. helped instill the idea 
of judicial review of the constitutionality of legislation. 
II.  THE RISE OF WORLD CONSTITUTIONALISM IN INDIA, SOUTH AFRICA, 
ITALY, FRANCE, POLAND, AND IRAN 
It should by now be clear that there was a “rise in world constitutionalism,” 
in Professor Ackerman’s words, from 1789 to 1945.15  Continental Europe, 
parts of Asia, and Latin America were all awash with written constitutions 
prior to 1945.  What makes the post-1945 rise in world constitutionalism, 
which Professor Ackerman discusses, so interesting and so unique is that it was 
accompanied by a rise in: 1) judicial review of the constitutionality of 
legislation, 2) by a rise of bills of rights, as well as by 3) a rise of systems of 
checks and balances.  This can be illustrated by briefly discussing the 
constitutional experience of some of the main countries Professor Ackerman 
discusses in Revolutionary Constitutions. 
A.  India 
Professor Ackerman is absolutely right to stress that it was a charismatic 
“mass political movement,” in the form of the Congress Party, led first by 
Mahatma Gandhi and then by Jawarlal Nehru, both charismatic leaders, that 
created the written Constitution of India.  But, as Professor Ackerman knows, 
Gandhi and Nehru did far more than that.  They also added to the Indian 
Constitution a very long and full bill of rights and a set of directive principles, 
concerning social and economic rights, that made the Indian Constitution quite 
revolutionary when it went into effect on January 26, 1950.  B.R. Ambedkar, 
the primary author of the Constitution of India, was an untouchable under the 
Hindu Caste System, and he wrote a revolutionary document that reflected his 
admiration of the U.S. Constitution from his days as a graduate student, spent 
at Columbia University in New York City.  Ambedkar got advice from U.S. 
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Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter on the writing of the Indian 
Constitution, and it was unanimously understood when the Indian Constitution 
was adopted that the Supreme Court of India would have the power of judicial 
review both of the structural and of the individual rights portions of the new 
constitution. 
India, in 1950, thus joined the United States, as a country with judicial 
review of all aspects of the constitutionality of legislation and not just 
federalism and separation of powers judicial review, which existed in Canada 
and Australia at that time.  The Bill of Rights of India was understood from the 
beginning to be enforceable through judicial review of all national and state 
legislation and executive orders.  After Indira Gandhi declared a state of 
emergency and assumed dictatorial powers in the 1970s, the Supreme Court of 
India had the public backing to: 1) assert the power to judicially review the 
constitutionality of constitutional amendments; 2) assert the power to dominate 
the process of appointing new justices to the Supreme Court of India; and 3) 
assert the power to assume jurisdiction over even matters raised only in a letter 
to the editors of an Indian newspaper.  The Supreme Court of India is thus by 
far and away the most powerful supreme court in the world.  It has more than 
enough power to check and balance the prime minister of India and his 
majority in the lower house of India’s bicameral legislature. 
The Supreme Court of India, however, is not the only check and balance on 
the power of a national prime minister, backed by a majority of the lower 
house.  There is also some power vested in the upper house of the Indian 
legislature, which represents the states and union territories, and which is 
always in session even during states of emergency.  There is also some power 
vested in the governments of the states and union territories, which are often 
controlled by the opposite political party from the one in power at the national 
level.  Since the S.R. Bomai v. Union of India16 decision in 1994, the national 
government has had only limited power to interfere with and replace state 
governments of the opposite political party.  Thus even aside from the very 
formidable powers of judicial review, which the Supreme Court of India had 
acquired by the 1980s, there are also other meaningful checks and balances in 
the Constitution of India as it has been applied. 
The lesson to be learned from India is not merely one of the rise of a written 
constitution, but also one of: 1) the rise of an unbelievably powerful system of 
judicial review and 2) the creation of an intricate and effective system of 
checks and balances.  The Indian system of checks and balances is different 
from the U.S. Madisonian system described in The Federalist Papers, but it is 
just as real and just as effective. 
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B.  South Africa 
Professor Ackerman’s second example of “the rise of world 
constitutionalism” is South Africa, which he correctly describes as being the 
product of a charismatic “mass political movement” led by Nelson Mandela, a 
charismatic leader, and his African National Congress Party and its Freedom 
Charter of 1955.  Once again, what is distinctive about the South African 
experience since the 1990s is not only that South Africa has a written 
constitution, but also that it has a bill of rights, which is judicially enforceable 
against the national legislature and executive, and that it has a working system 
of checks and balances.  The South African Constitution creates a 
Constitutional Court of South Africa that is so powerful that it judicially 
reviewed the South African Constitution before that document ever went into 
effect.  The South African Constitutional Court and Bill of Rights borrow 
significantly from the German and Canadian Bills of Rights and Constitutions, 
and the Constitutional Court is more than powerful enough by itself to 
constitute a meaningful check and balance on the president and bicameral 
legislature of South Africa. 
The South African Constitution divides and checks and balances power by 
having a bicameral legislature and nine provinces, but the division between the 
president and the Constitutional Court are the main checks and balances in the 
South African Constitution.  For more than twenty years now, South African 
democracy has been alive and well, which is far better than, for example, the 
record of the First and Second French Republics or of Weimar Germany.  
Again, South Africa’s system of checks and balances is different from the U.S. 
Madisonian system, but it is just as effective and just as real. 
C.  Italy 
Italy adopted its Constitution on December 22, 1947, and, as Professor 
Ackerman claims, it was the product of a mass political resistance to fascism, 
which came to power after the Allies conquered Italy in World War II.  What 
is distinctive about the Italian Constitution is that, unlike the Statuto Albertino, 
it is not interpreted and enforced by the Italian Parliament, but it is instead 
interpreted and enforced by the Constitutional Court of Italy, which came into 
existence in 1955.  The Italian Constitution, moreover, unlike the Statuto 
Albertino, contains a very generous classical liberal bill of rights, as well as 
recognizing some important socio-economic second generation constitutional 
rights.17 
It is quite clear that between 1955 and 2018 the Italian Constitutional Court, 
which can judicially enforce both the structural and the rights-protecting 
features of the Italian Constitution at both the national and the regional level, is 
a real powerhouse.  The Constitutional Court has more than enough power to 
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check and balance the prime minister of Italy, who must uniquely have a 
majority in both houses of the bicameral national legislature.  The Italian 
Constitution also checks and balances power by giving non-negligible powers 
to the president of Italy, who is slightly more than a ceremonial head of state, 
and by dividing power evenly between both houses of its national legislature.  
The Italian regions also have a bit of power, although not much, and the 
independent Court of Cassation and Council of State for civil, criminal, and 
administrative law cases also have some power.  Moreover, Italian voters 
sometimes play a role in constitutional amendments or on questions such as the 
legality of abortions in national referenda.  Italy thus has a vibrant system of its 
own checks and balances, which is different from the U.S. Madisonian system, 
but which works and is effective. 
D.  France 
Professor Ackerman describes in separate chapters the French experience 
with constitutionalism under both the Fourth and Fifth Republic constitutions, 
and he ascribes the cause of both to be a national charismatic mass popular 
movement.  Professor Ackerman correctly identifies the mass popular 
movement behind the Constitution of the Fourth Republic, which he seems to 
have an inexplicable, to me, affection for.  The Constitution of the Fourth 
Republic was almost identical to the Constitution of the Third Republic, which 
the Nazis obliterated in 1940. 
The main difference was that the Constitution of the Fourth Republic had a 
preamble that recognized both the constitutional status of the French 
Revolutionary Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen of 1789 and 
some second generation socio-economic rights circa 1945.  These rights 
protections were, however, meaningless in practice, since the Constitution of 
the Fourth Republic did not create a court with the power of judicial review.  
The Constitution of the Fourth Republic was to be enforced by the French 
parliament, like the Constitution of the Third Republic.  The only check and 
balance was a weak upper house of the legislature called the Senate.  This was 
not a meaningful check and balance at all. 
The lower, all-powerful house of parliament of the Fourth Republic, which 
elected the premier was elected using a radical system of proportional 
representation, which led to a ten party system and to weak coalition 
governments that were constantly falling due to votes of no confidence.  This 
system was so weak that it collapsed in 1958 because of a crisis in then-French 
occupied Algeria and threats of a military coup d’etat.  Just as the Third 
Republic was no match for Adolf Hitler in 1933, the Fourth Republic was also 
no match for a serious foreign policy crisis in Algeria.  It seems to me that a 
constitution which cannot provide ordered liberty is not a very good 
constitution.  The Constitution of the Fourth Republic suffered from all the 
flaws that characterized liberal written constitutions prior to 1945 outside of 
the United States, Canada, Australia, and Switzerland. 
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Professor Ackerman rightly identifies the Constitution of the Fifth Republic 
as having been created by a charismatic mass popular movement led by 
Charles De Gaulle, the former military leader of the French Resistance during 
World War II.  The Constitution of the Fifth Republic has grown organically 
over time from 1958, when its basic features were created, until 2008, fifty 
years later, when its Constitutional Council emerged as a full-fledged 
Constitutional Court.  I will focus my remarks on the Constitution of the Fifth 
Republic as it now exists, sixty years after it was created.  This constitution is 
now closing in on the seventy year record of the Constitution of the Third 
Republic as the longest lasting and most stable constitution in French history. 
The current Constitution of the Fifth Republic divides power between a 
president, who has some decree law-making powers, and the National 
Assembly, a majority of which elects the premier and his cabinet.  Both the 
president and the National Assembly ordinarily serve a five year term, and the 
recent practice has been to elect a new National Assembly about one month 
after a presidential election.  This has reduced the likelihood of gridlock due to 
co-habitation where one party controls the presidency and the other party 
controls the National Assembly.  Co-habitation did occur when French 
presidents served a seven year term prior to 2000.  Nonetheless, even when the 
president and the premier are from the same political party, they each have 
their own electoral mandate.  This helps to check and balance power. 
An attentive reader will have noticed by now that France currently has a two 
party system instead of the ten party system it had under the Fourth and Third 
Republics.  This is because no one can be elected president without receiving 
51% of the national vote, which has always required a run-off presidential 
election between the two highest vote getters in the first election.  Members of 
the National Assembly are also elected in two stage elections in territorial 
districts of the same kind that are used in the U.S. and in the U.K.  The effect 
of this has been to empower moderates and to disempower the extremes.  The 
radical right French National Front, for example—the party of Marine Le 
Pen—received 33.9% of the vote in the most recent French presidential 
election and 13% of the vote in the most recent National Assembly election.  It 
won only 8 out of 577 seats thanks to France’s quite sensible electoral system, 
which checks and balances power against extremists quite admirably. 
Power in France is further checked and balanced by an increasingly 
formidable Constitutional Council, which gained power in 1971, 1974, and 
2008.  Today, the Constitutional Council can enforce the 1789 Declaration of 
the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, and it polices the boundary line between 
presidential power and the power of the National Assembly.  There is also an 
upper house of the French legislature, the Senate, which must usually approve 
constitutional amendments by sitting in a congress with the National Assembly 
by a three-fifths vote.  A number of useful constitutional amendments have 
been passed in this way during the last sixty years. 
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All in all, France under the Fifth Republic, has, since 1958 joined the 
world’s constitutional democracies in having: 1) a meaningful system of 
judicial review; and 2) in having a meaningful set of checks and balances.  
French presidential power is still too great, in my opinion, but France does 
have more of a system of checks and balances than it has ever had before in its 
history. 
E.  Conclusion 
Professor Ackerman has a chapter in Revolutionary Constitutions on Poland, 
which he claims is a constitutional democracy, but, while Poland has a written 
Constitution and divides power between both houses of a parliament, I do not 
believe it is any longer a constitutional democracy because of the recent purge 
of the Polish Constitutional Court carried out by the ultra-right-wing Catholic 
government of that country.  Poland is a classic case of a pre-1945 country 
with a written constitution and bill of rights but without an independent 
judiciary.  I do not count such countries as being constitutional democracies 
that follow the rule of law.  Other examples of such countries include 
Argentina and Turkey. 
Professor Ackerman also has a fascinating Chapter on the Constitution of 
Iran, which does divide and check power between a guardian council, the 
president, and the parliament.  Here again, however, the Guardian Council 
tightly controls who can run for president, and there is no independent court 
system exercising a power of judicial review.  The Constitution of Iran is 
interesting for a study of authoritarian regimes, but I do not think it is helpful 
to understanding constitutional democracies. 
The bottom line is that Revolutionary Constitutionalism is very helpful, but 
the key things to look for in assessing whether or not a country is a 
constitutional democracy are: 1) the presence of an independent court system 
that follows the rule of law and which has the power of judicial review over 
national and state legislative and executive acts and 2) the existence of a 
meaningful system of checks and balances, which might be quite different 
from the U.S. Madisonian system of checks and balances.  By those criteria, 15 
of the G-20 nations stand out as constitutional democracies: 1) the U.S.; 2) the 
U.K.; 3) France; 4) Germany; 5) Japan; 6) Italy; 7) India; 8) Canada; 9) 
Australia; 10) South Korea; 11) Brazil; 12) South Africa; 13) Indonesia; 14) 
Mexico; and 15) the European Union.  It is to those countries’ systems of 
judicial review, which I will now turn. 
III.  THE ORIGINS AND GROWTH OF JUDICIAL REVIEW SINCE 1945 
In 1945, only three countries—the United States, Canada, and Australia—
had judicial review of the constitutionality of federal legislation.  Of those 
three countries, only the U.S. Constitution had a judicially enforceable bill of 
rights in 1945.  Canada did not add a serious judicially enforceable bill of 
rights until 1982, and Australia does not have one down to the present day.  In 
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1945, both Canada and Australia were committed to the British doctrine of 
parliamentary sovereignty except in federalism cases or in separation of 
powers case to protect judicial independence.  Switzerland in 1945 had judicial 
review of the constitutionality of laws passed by its cantons (i.e. state 
governments), but it did not have judicial review of federal legislation.  The 
United States was thus the only country in the world in 1945 with a judicially-
enforceable bill of rights in which the courts had the power to strike down 
federal laws as being unconstitutional. 
In my forthcoming two volume book series, The History and Growth of 
Judicial Review in the G-20 Constitutional Democracies, I show the causes of 
the origin and growth of judicial review in the G-20 nations, which are 
constitutional democracies.  I have identified four major causes of the origins 
and growth of judicial review of the constitutionality of federal legislation 
under bills of rights, as well as enforcing federalism and separation of powers 
partitions of power.  I will describe each of those causes in a paragraph below.  
I will then identify two other possible causes of the birth of judicial review.  
Finally, I will briefly (for space reasons) discuss each of the fifteen G-20 
constitutional democracies and will explain the causes of the birth and growth 
of judicial review in those countries. 
A.  Causes of the Growth and Origins of Judicial Review 
The first major cause of the birth and growth of judicial review of the 
constitutionality of federal and state legislation is the need for an umpire in 
countries which have a federal system of government.  Professors Mauro 
Capelletti, Martin Shapiro, Barry Friedman, Erin Delaney, and I have all 
written about this phenomenon.  Once one limits and enumerates national and 
state powers either a supreme court or a constitutional court has to police the 
limitations and enumerations.  The need for a federalism umpire has caused 
judicial review of the constitutionality of national legislation to originate and 
grow in a number of countries. 
For the same reasons, Professors Martin Shapiro and I have also argued 
when a constitution sets up a national separation of powers system, as do the 
constitutions of the United States and France, an umpire is needed to police the 
enumerated and separated powers of different branches in a national separation 
of powers system.  The need for a separation of powers umpire has caused 
judicial review to originate and grow in a number of countries.  These 
countries include: the United States, France, and the nations of Eastern Europe, 
which modeled their constitutions on France’s as well as such parliamentary 
democracies as India, Canada, and Australia, where notwithstanding the fusing 
of the executive and legislative powers the Supreme Court polices the 
independence of the judicial power in a separation of powers way. 
The second major cause of the birth and growth of judicial review is the 
rights from wrongs phenomenon described by Allan Dershowitz in Rights from 
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Wrongs: A Secular Theory of the Origins of Rights.18  Professor Dershowitz 
argues that constitutional rights are historical in their origins, and do not arise 
from natural law, but arise instead when a great wrong is committed, is widely 
recognized to have been a wrong, and so a constitutional right arises in its 
place.  Examples include: the British use of general warrants giving rise to the 
U.S. Fourth Amendment; the Holocaust in Germany giving rise to a huge 
rights culture in that country’s constitution; and racial apartheid, in South 
Africa, giving rise to a very rights protective constitution there. 
A third major cause of the birth and growth of judicial review is borrowing 
the institution from other countries that have it, and then tailoring it to fit local 
circumstances.  Judicial review in the federalism and separation of powers 
context was borrowed by Canada and Australia from the U.S.; and in other 
contexts U.S. judicial review was also borrowed by Brazil and Mexico while 
German judicial review was borrowed in the 1920s by Czechoslovakia and 
Austria.  India directly borrowed the idea of a judicially enforceable Bill of 
Rights from the United State in 1950 setting an example for all nations writing 
post-1950 constitutions.  Most recently, South Africa borrowed ideas from the 
German and Canadian experience in setting up its system of judicial review.  
Borrowing is thus a major factor in the origination and growth of systems of 
judicial review. 
A fourth cause of the birth and growth of judicial review is the existence of a 
systems of checks and balances so the supreme or constitutional court does not, 
as in Japan, face off against a unitary, non-federal regime, with a fused 
parliamentary executive/legislative majority government.  Judicial review 
works best in settings where political power is diffused among multiple 
political actors through a system of checks and balances, bicameralism, the 
separation of powers, federalism, and the holding of mid-term electiions.  In 
the U.S., the Supreme Court has political space in which to act because 
democratic power is divided among the president, the senate, the house of 
representatives, and the fifty state governments.  There is nothing like this 
system of checks and balances in Japan, which is one reason why judicial 
review has not worked in Japan. 
 Professor Ran Hirschl argues that judicial review is born out of the desire of 
a fading hegemonic elite to entrench its values in a judicially policed 
constitution as it is losing political power.  Ran Hirschl argues that judicial 
review originated in this way in South Africa in the 1990’s; in Canada, in 
1982; in Israel, in the 1990’s; and in New Zealand.19  I disagree with Professor 
Hirschl based on the country studies in my forthcoming two volume book on  
The History and Growth of Judicial Review. 
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Profeessor Tom Ginsburg argues that judicial review is born because even in 
two party systems members of both parties want to ensure that their 
fundamental rights will be protected even when they are out of power 
politically.  This phenomenon is identified as being a desire for “insurance and 
commitment” by Professor Tom Ginsburg in Judicial Review in New 
Democracies,20 which he claims explains the origins of judicial review in 
South Korea in the 1980s; in Taiwan; and in Mongolia.  I disagree with 
Professor Ginsburg on his claim that a desire for insurance and commitment 
explains the origins of judicial review in the countries he studies.  I argue in 
The History and Growth of Judicial Review that that institution almost never 
originates for “insurance and commitment” reasons, although it may well grow 
in power and be retained for those reasons. 
This then concludes my discussion of the birth and growth of judicial review 
except that I should add that this discussion relates to Professor Ackerman’s 
book Revolutionary Constitutions, wherein he discusses the mass popular 
movement as the engine of the constitutionalization of judicial review in the 
countries he studies in that book.  I agree with him that charismatic mass 
popular movements were at work in the countries Professor Ackerman studies 
and during the time periods Professor Ackerman mentions.  I would add that I 
think in each of those instances the mass popular movement arose because of a 
great wrong, in Professor Dershowitz’s language, and that led to the 
constitutionalization of great rights.  I will briefly explain how Professor 
Ackerman’s typology blends with the phenomenon I describe in my two 
volume book series. 
Professor Ackerman quite correctly describes the Congress Party of India as 
a mass popular movement that constitutionalized its charisma.  I agree and 
think it was the great historical wrong of British colonial oppression of India 
which led to the rights protective Constitution of India being adopted, and it 
was the great historical wrong of Indira Ghandi’s State of Emergency that 
empowered the Supreme Court of India to become much more activist.  
Similarly, Professor Ackerman quite correctly describes the African National 
Congress Party of South Africa as being a mass popular movement that 
constitutionalized its charisma with its call for the  Freedom Charter of 1955.  I 
again agree and think it was the great historical wrong of racial apartheid that 
led to the origins of judicial review in that country. 
With respect to France under the Fourth Republic and Italy after World War 
II, Professor Ackerman argues that it was charismatic mass popular 
movements, which had resisted fascism, which constitutionalized their 
charisma in those countries post-1945.  I agree with Professor Ackerman and 
think it was the great historical wrong of fascism that gave origin to judicial 
review constitutionalism with lots of rights in both of those two countries.  A 
similar process occurred with respect to Poland where the great historical 
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wrong of Stalinist communism led after the collapse of the Berlin Wall to a 
written, and judicially enforceable Bill of Rights and Constitution as a great 
right. 
The final mass popular movement, which Professor Ackerman discusses in 
his book, Revolutionary Constitutions, Volume I, is Gaullism, a movement led 
by former General Charles De Gaulle, a flawed, charismatic leader who wrote 
France’s Constitution of the Fifth Republic in 1958.  In that Constitution, as 
subsequently amended, De Gaulle constitutionalized both his own and his 
movement’s charisma.  Gaullism was, if we accept De Gaulle’s premises, a 
rights from wrongs phenomenon.  In De Gaulle’s view, the French Third 
Republic, which lasted from 1870 to 1940, had a fatally weak executive 
branch, which failed to stop Hitler when he came to power in Germany and 
could easily have been stopped prior to the Nazi rearmament of Germany.  
Also, in De Galle’s view, the French Fourth Republic, which lasted from 1946 
to 1958, had a fatally weak executive branch and an excessively weak electoral 
law, which failed to stop an attempted coup d’etat by the French military in 
1958 due to a costly colonial war over independence in Algeria.  The strong 
presidential constitutional structure of the French Fifth Republic, and its total 
repudiation of proportional representation, was thus due to a mass popular 
movement with a charismatic leader who, in his own mind, was acting for 
rights from wrongs reasons. 
B.  The Fifteen G-Twenty Constitutional Democracies 
1.  The United States 
Judicial review originated in the United States during the colonial period 
between 1660 and 1776 when the English king’s Privy Council reviewed and 
either approved or rejected proposed colonial laws, depending on whether or 
not they were “repugnant to the laws of England.”  The colonists could depart 
from English law where local circumstances dictated that they do so, but not 
otherwise.  As a practical matter, the thirteen original U.S. colonies were used 
to having an English Court, the Privy Council, engaging in a form of 
federalism umpiring.  Between 1776 and 1787, Professor Gordon S. Wood has 
persuaded me that there was a huge change in American’s views of judicial 
power.  American judges were given life tenure for the first time from 1776 on 
and, by the 1780s, the colonialists were urging their state supreme courts to 
strike down unconstitutional laws. 
Americans knowingly embraced judicial review when they ratified the U.S. 
Constitution because Alexander Hamilton said in The Federalist No. 78 that 
the U.S. Constitution provided for and required judicial review.  Every 
exercise by the Supreme Court of the power of judicial review that I am aware 
of from 1789 to 1861 involved either federalism or separation of powers 
umpiring except for Contract Clause cases 
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The post-Civil War Reconstruction Amendments—especially the Fourteenth 
Amendment—and critical federal civil rights laws and a statute giving federal 
district judge federal question jurisdiction in 1875 greatly expanded the power 
of the federal courts.  This expansion in federal judicial powers of judicial 
review occurred for rights from wrongs reasons.  The enslavement of African 
Americans, and the passage in southern states in 1865 of discriminatory Black 
Codes, were a great historical wrong, which the Reconstruction Amendments 
and statutes, generally, were meant to correct.  Judicial Review was thus born 
again after Reconstruction in a new and more powerful form. 
There was also an element of elite hegemonic entrenchment behind the 
adoption of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.  The proponents of 
those amendments were worried that once the eleven Confederate states were 
re-seated in Congress there might come a time when anti-civil rights democrats 
would outnumber pro-civil rights republicans and would repeal the Civil 
Rights Act of 1866.  Thus, the Fourteenth Amendment was enacted to ensure 
this never happened. 
To compress radically, a mass popular movement took place on behalf of the 
proposition that “separate, but equal,” treatment of the races was allowed by 
the Fourteenth Amendment prevailed during the Social Darwinist era from 
1883 to 1945.  This is, as Michael McConnell has rightly called it “America’s 
Forgotten Constitutional Moment.”  Whereas most intellectuals in the 1780’s 
believed that all men were created equal, most intellectuals, in 1900, thought 
that man had evolved from apes; that some races of men were better than were 
other races of men; and, that, in Rudyard Kipling’s words, Americans should 
take up “the white man’s burden” and rule the Philppines, just as the U.K., 
France, and Germany were ruling Africa and Asia.  The horrors of the 
Holocaust and of Nazism shatterred Social Darwinism forever.  The U.S. 
written Universal Declaration of Human Rights begins by saying “All human 
beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights.”  After 1945, racist 
colonial empires were illegitimace, and race discrimination in the U.S. Armed 
forces was held illigitimate in 1948 and in public schools in 1954. 
The U.S. Supreme Court during Franklin D. Roosevelt’s lifetime was a 
Thayerian, highly deferential body..  From 1937 to 1954, the rational basis test 
almost always carried the day in the Supreme Court, and judicial review in the 
United States was almost dead.21  This is shown by six of the eight New Deal 
Supreme Court justices joining the horrrendous, racist Thayerian judicial 
restraint holding in Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).  
Korematsu is the poster child of New Deal constitutionalism.  No matter how 
egregious the violation of rights the New Deal justices would just defer to the 
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political branched and in particualr to FDR who had appointed eight out of 
nine justices on the Supreme Court. 
The Thayerian choke-hold on judicial review from 1937 to 1952 ended when 
the Supreme Court by a vote of 6 to 3 struck down the seizure of private steel 
mills by President Harry Truman, F.D.R.’s successor, in Youngstown Sheet & 
Tube Co, v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).   From 1954 to 1969, a mass popular 
movement to secure equal civil and voting rights for African Americans 
emerged, and the Supreme Court spoke as the mouthpiece of this movement in 
its unanimous repudiation of the separate but equal idea in 1954 in Brown v. 
Board of Education, which held race discrimination in public schools to be 
unconstitutional.22  This mass popular movement culminated with 
congressional passage of: 1) the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which forbade both 
race and sex discrimination; 2) the Voting Rights Act of 1965, which re-
enfranchised African American voters; 3) the acceptance that affirmative 
action to help African Americans and later women was needed; 4) the right to 
racial intermarriage recognized by the Supreme Court in Loving v. Virginia;23 
5) a shift during the 1970’s in Supreme Court caselaw to give heightened 
scrutiny to sex discrimination; and 6) a cultural shift on the rights of same sex 
couples that began in 1969 but was not finally codified by the Supreme Court 
until Obergefell v. Hodges24 in 2015.  Between 1952 and 1969, most of the 
federal Bill of Rights was incorporated to apply against the states.   Individual 
rights judicial review was thus reborn during this period of time. 
From 1969 to 2021, the New Deal rational basis test for reviewing the 
constitutionality of federal and state legislation was replaced by a 
reasonableness test, in my opinion; in federalism cases from 1991 to 2021; in 
separation of powers cases from 1976 to 2021; and in unenumerated 
constitutional and enumerated constitutional rights cases from 1965 to 2021.  
Meanwhile, freedom of expression has become the ultimate constitutional 
value.  From the Supreme Court’s decision in Roe v. Wade,25 in 1973, up until 
today, the Court’s protection of constitutional abortion rights for women has 
been constant, and I think will continue to be constant.   
A mass political movement begun by President Ronald Reagan, in 1981, 
and, continued, methodically by the two Bush presidents, and by former 
President Trump, has led to a temporary 6 to 3 Republican majority on the 
Supreme Court, as of  January 2021.  Some U.S. Democrats may want to go 
the way of Poland and pack the Supreme Court themselve in revenge.  
There is a better way out for the rule of law.  First, the current six 
Republican justices should make it clear that they will not vote to cut back on 
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either abortion rights or the rights of LGBTQ+ people.  And, second, the best 
long-term solution would be for the United States to adopt a constitutional 
amendment creating fixed 18 year terms for Supreme Court justices, with one 
seat opening up on July 1st during the first and third years of each presidential 
term.  This would guarantee that every one term president would get two 
appointees, and every session oof the Senate would confirm one appointee. 
Judicial Review in the United States arose for: 1) umpiring reasons; and 2) 
rights from wrongs reasons in 1868 and 1870.  Judicial review died from 1937 
to 1952 thanks to James Bradley Thayer, but it was born again from 1952 to 
2021 for umpiring and rights from wrongs reasons in Youngstown and in 
Brown, respectively.  The growth of judicial power from 1952 to 2021 
probably also results from: 3) the U.S. system of checks and balances, which 
allows the Court political space within which to maneuver in between 
separately elected presidents, senates, houses of representatives, governors, 
and bicameral state legislatures. 
2.  France 
Judicial Review originated in France in 1958 for separation of powers 
umpiring reasons.  Charles De Gaulle’s 1958 Constitution, as amended in the 
1960s, created a separately elected president of France, with decree law-
making power, and a National Assembly of France, a majority of which would 
elect the premier and the cabinet with the power to make laws.  A nine member 
Constitutional Council was created to umpire disputes between the president 
and the National Assembly. 
The French Constitutional Council greatly enhanced its power in 1971 in its 
widely praised Freedom of Association26 decision striking down as 
unconstitutional a conservative government’s refusal to allow a left wing group 
to organize.  In that decision, the Constitutional Council announced it had the 
power to enforce the 1789 French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the 
Citizen, as well as fundamental principle of the Republic, thereby giving 
France a judicial enforceable bill of rights.  Both the 1971 court decision and 
the 1789 Declaration of Rights were the products of a rights from wrongs 
process. 
In 1974, the Constitution of the Fifth Republic was amended to give sixty 
members of either the National Assembly or of the otherwise weak French 
Senate standing to challenge a law before it was promulgated before the 
Constitutional Council on constitutional grounds.  Prior to 1974, only four high 
officials of the government had standing to challenge laws before the 
Constitutional Council, rendering that body very weak.  The 1974 expansion in 
standing was promoted by President Valéry Giscard D’Estaing, a classical 
liberal, governing in alliance with a larger Gaullist majority.  The 1974 
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parliament had four major parties: 1) the Gaullists; 2) the followers of Giscard 
D’Estaing; 3) the Socialists; and 4) the Communists.  In this environment, all 
four parties wanted to expand judicial review for insurance and commitment 
reasons.  No one party was dominant, and no one knew what the next election 
would bring.  Expanded judicial review was thus in everyone’s best interest. 
The 1974 expansion of judicial review by giving sixty members of either the 
National Assembly or the Senate standing to sue before a law was promulgated 
meant that every law was challenged for constitutionality, which turned the 
Constitutional Council into a powerful, co-equal, third house of the 
legislature.27  Eventually, in 2008, the ordinary court of cassation, which has 
the last word on criminal and civil cases, and the council of state, which has 
the last word on administrative law matters, were required by a constitutional 
amendment to allow ordinary litigants to raise constitutional issues concerning 
laws that were already on the books, which the ordinary courts were bound to 
refer for decision to the Constitutional Council.  This huge expansion in 
judicial review occurred primarily because France wanted to borrow similar 
successful uses of judicial review in ordinary cases in countries like Germany, 
Italy, and Spain. 
French judicial review emerged for: 1) separation of powers umpiring 
reasons; 2) rights from wrongs reasons in 1971; 3) insurance and commitment 
reasons in 1974; and 4) borrowing reasons in 2008. 
3.  Germany 
The German Constitution, or Basic Law, emerged in 1949 primarily for 
rights from wrongs reasons in response to the horrors of the Holocaust and the 
Nazi dictatorship of Adolf Hitler.  The Basic Law begins with a comprehensive 
bill of rights, which itself contains an unamendable protection of human 
dignity in all its various permutations.  Fundamentally, and at its core, the 
German Basic Law and the creation of German judicial review of the 
constitutionality of both federal and state legislation and executive actions 
occurred for rights from wrongs reasons. 
A distinctly secondary, facilitating cause of the origins of judicial review in 
German is that the Basic Law contemplates the Constitutional Court playing a 
significant umpiring role in federalism and separation of powers cases.  The 
Constitutional Court has played such a role in practice. 
Third, and finally, judicial review in Germany using the Concentrated Court 
model was borrowed from the constitutions of Czechoslovakia and Austria as 
designed by the famous legal scholar Hans Kelsen.  Concentrated Court 
models of judicial review empower only one constitutional court to enforce the 
constitution and not thousands of lower federal and state court judges as in the 
United States.  Germany improved on the Kelsenian Model by allowing for 
vigorous judicial enforcement of individual liberties under its bill of rights.  In 
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addition, the members of a constitutional court serve for a fixed term of 
years—twelve years in Germany—and they are picked by special political 
processes.  In Germany half of the Constitutional Court justices are elected by 
a two-thirds vote of a plenum of the lower house of the legislature, while the 
other half are elected by a two thirds vote of the upper house of the legislature 
in which state government officials sit as members having both federal and 
state offices simultaneously.  A final feature of the Concentrated Court model 
is that the rulings of such a court have erga omnes effect.  This means they 
bind other courts in Germany and the legislatures and executives in Germany 
as a constitutional command.  This feature of Concentrated Court judicial 
review makes such courts especially appealing in countries that have civil law 
system and are not used to the concept of binding judicial opinions and 
decisions. 
Judicial review in Germany from 1949 to 2018 has been hugely successful.  
Public opinion polls consistently reveal that the Constitutional Court ranks 
higher than any other part of the German government in popularity.  This is to 
some extent a result of the fact that ordinary citizens have standing to bring 
constitutional complaints about any matter, which they wish to raise before the 
Constitutional Court.  The Court has struck down as unconstitutional more 
than six hundred laws or executive actions since it was established in 1951, 
and the Court vigorously protects enumerated constitutional rights; 
unenumerated constitutional rights; federalism; and the separation of powers.  
The borrowing of the Kelsenian idea has been very, very successful.  Germany 
has become a better model, than is the United States, as to how to make 
judicial review work in other civil law countries such as continental Europe, 
Asia, Africa, and Latin America. 
4.  Italy 
The Italian experience with the origins of judicial review is very similar to 
the experience in Germany after Hitler.  Italians after Mussolini wanted a full 
bill of rights at the start of their Constitution, and the principal cause of the 
birth of judicial review in Italy, which did not go into effect until 1955, was a 
rights from wrongs dynamic.  Italy had experienced grievous wrongs as a result 
of fascism and the Holocaust, and the judicially enforceable bill of rights was a 
response to those wrongs.  Italian communists and socialists made their 
approval of judicial review contingent on the bill of rights protecting second 
generation social entitlements, and so those rights came into being as well.  
Italy took some time getting judicial review up and going, which did not 
happen until 1955, but from its first important decision on, the Italian 
Constitutional Court undertook the process of scrubbing Italian law free of 
fascist legislation, which was still on the books. 
As in Germany, a secondary cause of the origins of judicial review in Italy 
was the need for an institution to umpire between the co-equal Houses of the 
bicameral parliament and the government; between the government and the 
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president of the Republic; between the parliament and the president of the 
Republic; between the high court of cassation, which hears criminal and civil 
cases, and the council of state, which hears administrative law matters; 
between the regions and the national government; and, finally, in supervising 
popular referenda.  Umpiring is not the primary reason why Italy has judicial 
review, but there is no doubt that the court plays a valuable umpiring role. 
A third, and final cause of the origination of judicial review in Italy is that 
the multiple political groups that Professor Ackerman describes at the Italian 
Constitutional Convention may have wanted for insurance and commitment 
reasons to guarantee certain basic rights when they were not in power 
politically.  Post World War II Italy, from 1946 to 1991, had a multi-party 
system with a large Christian Democratic Party; Classical Liberal Parties; a 
Socialist Party; and the West’s largest and most tame Communist Party.  Given 
this party system, any one party, other than the Christian Democrats, expected 
sometimes to be opposed to the government so those entities, along with the 
Communist Party, which could not enter the government until 1991, all had an 
incentive to favor the birth and growth of Italian judicial review.  The Italian 
system of checks and balances, like the different German system of checks and 
balances, favored the growth of judicial review. 
Italy then originated and experienced the growth of judicial review for: 1) 
rights from wrongs reasons; 2) umpiring reasons in a system of checks and 
balances; 3) reasons of insurance and commitment; and 4) because Italy’s 
system of checks and balances left political space within which the 
Constitutional Court could act. 
5.  Japan 
General Douglas MacArthur imposed the current constitution of Japan on 
Japanese elites following the amending process of Japan’s prior Meiji 
Constitution.  The Constitution can only be amended by a two thirds vote of 
both houses of the legislature and subsequent majority ratification of any 
amendment in a national election by a majority of Japanese voters, and no 
constitutional amendments have ever been adopted.  While the current 
conservative Japanese government would love to scrap Japan’s western liberal 
constitution, Japanese voters will not approve of such a move.  As a result, the 
government of Japan is stuck with a constitution it does not like and which it 
cannot change. 
MacArthur’s Constitution contains an ample and generous bill of rights and 
confers the power of judicial review on the Supreme Court of Japan and on 
inferior courts.  Judicial review appears in the Constitution of Japan because 
MacArthur borrowed the institution from the U.S. Constitution.  MacArthur 
did not set up a Concentrated Court Kelsenian system like Germany’s or 
Italy’s because he was probably unaware of this as an alternative to the Diffuse 
U.S. model of judicial review, and he probably did not realize that a Kelsenian 
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system with citizen standing would have been more suited to Japan, which is, 
like Germany, a civil law nation. 
The Supreme Court of Japan has only held eight laws unconstitutional in its 
seventy-year history.  I think this is because Japan is a unitary nation state, 
with a parliamentary government fusing legislative power and a one party 
political system.  The Supreme Court of Japan does not have the political space 
a court needs to make judicial review work. 
6.  India 
Judicial review originated in British colonial India in the same way in which 
it did in colonial North America.  From 1858 to 1947, British government over 
India was centralized in the prerogative powers of the monarch as exercised 
executively by the viceroy of India and as exercised judicially by the Judicial 
Committee of the Privy Council (JCPC).  Under the Colonial Laws Validity 
Act 1865, the imperial colonies could not adopt laws that were repugnant to 
the laws of England or to other acts of the British parliament. 
This is the same standard of review, which the Privy Council had used with 
the thirteen North American colonies between 1660 and 1776.  As a result, 
India experienced a long period of time between 1858 and 1931 during which 
it became quite accustomed to having an imperial Supreme Court, the JCPC, 
scrutinizing the legality of Indian laws under imperial British law.  This 
experience helped to pave the way for origins of judicial review of the 
constitutionality of legislation.28  P.A. Howell, The Judicial Committee of the 
Privy Council, 1833-1876. 
The British also set up many High Courts initially staffed by British 
barristers in major Indian cities to hear cases and appeals from those courts 
could be taken to the JCPC in London.  By the 1930s, it became clear that the 
British Empire was winding down, and the Statute of Westminster 1931 
repealed the Colonial Laws Validity Act 1865, thus freeing the Indian 
legislature elected under the Government of India Act 1935 to legislate in ways 
that were openly contrary to British law.  By 1947, all but two judges on one 
Indian High Court were native Indian barristers.  The process of decolonization 
was thus in many ways complete when India formally declared its 
independence from Britain in 1947. 
Colonial India had dozens of separately administered states and 565 Princely 
States covering 48% of the territory of colonial India prior to independence in 
1947.  Federalism was thus a part of the way of life in British India.  In turn, 
when British India ceased to exist four new nations came to exist as of the 
present day: India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Myanmar.  India today has 
twenty-nine states and seven Union territories, and, although it has a very 
powerful national government, which can in emergencies devolve state 
governments, India does have today a federal system, which means it does 
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need a federalism umpire, especially since the Indian states are very litigious 
and sue each other a lot.  Moreover, the Indian courts are highly activist 
common law courts that strike down any separation of powers intrusion on 
their judicial power.  There is thus vigorous separation of powers umpiring that 
goes on in India on a truly vast scale. 
One cause then of the origins of judicial review in India is: 1) the historical 
practice of British umpiring judicial review; 2) the federal structure of India, 
which often requires umpiring between two states when they sue each other, 
which happens often; and 3) separation of powers umpiring in which Indian 
courts have: 1) successfully claimed the power to declare unconstitutional 
certain constitutional amendments; 2) successfully claimed the power of the 
justices of the Supreme Court of India to pick their own successors; and 3) 
successfully eliminated all standing rules, which might otherwise have 
constrained judicial power. 
The most important cause of judicial review in India, however, is not 
umpiring, but instead, the rights from wrongs phenomenon.  This phenomenon 
has played out twice in Indian history over the course of the twentieth century.  
First, when India declared independence from Britain in 1947, most Indians 
justifiably believed that the British were racist, colonial oppressors who sucked 
their country dry of labor and goods all for the benefit of the British Isles.  
Indians believed that the British had committed great wrongs and the many 
rights in the very lengthy Indian Bill of Rights were put there to make sure 
those rights would never again be violated. 
India’s decision to write a constitution with a written bill of rights, which 
was judicially enforceable by the Supreme Court of India against all levels of 
government and all government officials, was an enormous departure from the 
British Westminster Model of Parliamentary Sovereignty.  In adopting a 
judicially enforceable bill of rights, India borrowed from U.S. constitutional 
law, which was well known to Dr. B. R. Ambedkar, the framer of the Indian 
Constitution.  Dr. Ambedkar was an untouchable who had received a PhD 
from Columbia University in New York.  He greatly admired the U.S. Bill of 
Rights and our system of judicial review of the constitutionality of federal and 
state legislation, and he quite successfully imported them into India.  The goal 
in doing so was to prevent the wrongs of racism, colonialism, or of other 
abuses of power from ever happening again. 
This alone was enough to get judicial review up and running in India from 
1950 until Prime Minister Indira Gandhi’s state of emergency, in the 1970’s.  
During this time, the Supreme Court of India frequently exercised its power of 
judicial review, but not in any very dramatic way.  The state of emergency and 
the break in democratic rule under Indira Gandhi, however, was perceived by 
most Indians as a grave wrong, which required a much more powerful system 
of judicial review.  After the end of the state of emergency, the Supreme Court 
established the power: 1) for judicial review of the constitutionality of 
constitutional amendments; 2) for the Supreme Court Justices to pick their own 
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successors; and 3) for assertion of jurisdiction over any matter, even if raised 
only in a letter to the editor of a newspaper without regard to traditional rules 
of standing.  The judicial review power of the Supreme Court of India thus not 
only originated because of a rights from wrongs process; it also grew 
enormously thanks to a rights from wrongs process. 
India is not a country where two co-equal political parties have agreed on 
judicial review for insurance and commitment reasons.  It is also not a country 
where fading hegemonic elites sought in 1947 to entrench their values in the 
Constitution for fear they would someday lose power.  To the contrary, India 
has been governed by the founding Congress Party for most of its history. 
Judicial review in India thus originated and grew for: 1) rights from wrongs 
reasons; 2) umpiring reasons; 3) because of borrowing; and 4) because 
governmental power in federal India with its bicameral legislature and 
ceremonial president is sufficiently diffused to leave political space in which 
the courts can act. 
7.  Canada 
From the British North America Act 1867 until the abolition of appeals to 
the Privy Council in 1949, Canada was governed as a British colony until 1931 
and the decisions of the Canadian Supreme Court were appealable to the 
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council (JCPC) until 1949.  Canada thus grew 
up with the same experience as had the United States and India of JCPC 
judicial federalism umpiring among matters, which were handled at the British 
imperial level; matters that could properly be handled at the national Canadian 
level; and matters that could be handled at the Canadian provincial level.  The 
JCPC adopted a very literal, formal reading of the British North America Act 
1867, as it then was called, which read Canadian national powers very 
narrowly and Canadian provincial powers very broadly.  That caselaw has 
been accepted and built upon by the Supreme Court of Canada since it was 
freed of JCPC review in 1949. 
In addition to engaging in federalism umpiring, the JCPC also umpired 
separation of powers disputes, and the Supreme Court of Canada continues 
down to the present day to umpire both separation of powers and federalism 
cases.  There is thus no question at all that Canadian judicial review originated 
in 1867 and grew until 1982 for umpiring reasons.  Since 1982, the Canadian 
Supreme Court has continued to play umpire, but it has assumed a much more 
powerful role as the guarantor of the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms, a document which it has interpreted to produce outcomes 
Americans might associate with the Earl Warren Supreme Court. 
Former Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau engineered some major changes in 
1982 to the Canadian Constitution.  Trudeau’s mission was to “patriate” the 
Canadian Constitution by permanently ending the authority of the British 
Parliament over Canada.  Instead of declaring independence from the U.K., as 
the United States and India had done, Trudeau persuaded the U.K. Parliament 
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to pass a series of statutes applicable to Canada in 1982.  The first statue 
created a Charter of Rights and Freedoms for Canadians, which was judicially 
enforceable with second look judicial review.  The second statute created a 
complex amending process whereby Canada could itself amend its constitution 
without having to ask the U.K. Parliament to amend it for Canadians.  The 
third statue renamed the British North America Act 1867 to be instead the 
Canadian Constitution Act 1867.  The fourth and final statute ended once and 
for all any U.K. sovereignty over Canada except for the continuing role of 
Queen Elizabeth II as the queen of Canada, represented there by her Canadian 
governor general. 
The 1982 constitutional changes were supported by the nine English 
speaking provinces but not by the French speaking province of Quebec, which 
wanted and did not get constitutional recognition that it was a co-equal 
Founding Society of Canada.  Professor Ran Hirschl argues in Towards 
Juristocracy29 that the enormous increase in the judicial review power of the 
Supreme Court of Canada, effectuated by adopting the Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms, would disproportionally benefit English-speaking Canada and hurt 
Quebec, which had only three seats on the Supreme Court of Canada.  
Professor Hirschl argues (implausibly to me) that the real motivation behind 
the adoption of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms in 1982 was a 
desire by a fading anglo-phone elite to hegemonically entrench itself in power 
as Quebec separatism was starting to crest. 
I think Canadian judicial review was deliberately expanded from the 
umpiring context in 1982 to the rights context for two reasons.  First, Prime 
Minister Pierre Trudeau was himself of French Canadian origin, and he was 
the father of the system of everything being bilingual in Canada.  This 
excellent bilingual system seems to have in the end eliminated Quebec’s desire 
to secede from Canada.  But, I suspect that Pierre Trudeau, prior to becoming 
Prime Minister Trudeau, experienced discrimination or hardship caused by 
English-speaking Canadians against himself, as a French-speaking Canadian.  
The wrongs the English committed in Canada are mild compared to the wrongs 
they committed in India, but it is out of those wrongs that I think the idea of a 
charter of rights was born.  There is thus a rights from wrongs story to be told 
about the expansion of Canadian judicial review in 1982. 
Second, Trudeau was a great admirer of the Warren Court and its judicial 
activism, and he wanted to borrow that for Canada by adopting a Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms to be enforced in a purposive way by the Supreme Court 
of Canada.  Trudeau was successful in creating a Warren Court in Canada.  
The borrowed institution took root and grew hugely.  Today, Canadians have 
unlimited abortion rights; the right to keep a brothel and to be a pimp; and the 
right to assisted suicide.  The Canadian Supreme Court has gone way beyond 
the U.S. Supreme Court especially in recent years. 
                                                 
 29. HIRSCHL, supra note 16. 
2020] The Global Rise of Judicial Review Since 1945 437 
Canadian judicial review thus originated and grew for: 1) umpiring reasons; 
2) rights from wrongs reasons; 3) borrowing reasons; and 4) because power is 
sufficiently diffused by federalism and a bicameral national legislature, so that 
the Canadian Supreme Court has the political space within which to act. 
8.  Australia 
Judicial review of the constitutionality of legislation originated in Australia 
prior to 1901 because the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council (JCPC) had 
final jurisdiction to hear appeals from the highest courts of the six Australian 
states including the power to adjudicate whether those state’s legislatures were 
exceeding their powers under their colonial charters.  After the adoption of the 
Australian Constitution Act 1901, the JCPC had the last word on all cases 
decided by the High Court of Australia, which is the supreme national court of 
that country. 
The Australian Constitution Act 1901 contains no bill of rights and no such 
document has ever been adopted in Australia as of 2018.  As a result, judicial 
review originated and grew in Australia solely for federalism and separation of 
powers umpiring reasons.  In addition, a working system of checks and 
balances through federalism and bicameralism at the national legislature, with 
a powerful upper House of the legislature, gives the High Court of Australia 
the political space to act.  None of the other causes of the origination and 
growth of judicial review apply to Australia except that the Australians 
borrowed the idea of judicial review from the U.S. Constitution, which was a 
partial model for the Australian Constitution. 
Judicial review in Australia thus emerged for umpiring, borrowing, and 
checks and balances reasons. 
9.  South Korea 
Judicial review emerged in South Korea in the 1980s when that country 
finally became a constitutional democracy after decades of rule by three 
dictators who called themselves presidents.  South Korea is a civil law country 
with a German style constitutional court, a unicameral legislature and a 
separately elected president who can be impeached by the legislature and 
removed from office by the Constitutional Court.  Two South Korean 
presidents have been impeached.  The first one was acquitted by the 
Constitutional Court, but the second one was quite recently removed from 
office by the Constitutional Court leading to new presidential elections, which 
the opposition leftist party won.  The South Korean Constitutional Court is 
obviously quite powerful in exercising its powers of judicial review and in 
having removed an elected president of the country. 
Judicial review and a bill of rights appeared in South Korea for rights from 
wrongs reasons after more than forty years of brutal dictatorship and rights 
violations, in my opinion.  Professor Tom Ginsburg, who is an expert on Asian 
studies, has written that judicial review also emerged in South Korea because 
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two roughly co-equal political parties engaged in insurance and commitment.  I 
defer to his judgment on that.  The Korean Constitutional Court is also 
borrowed from the German example for a civil law country, and it also 
engages in a minimal amount of separation of powers umpiring.  South Korea 
may have wanted to borrow judicial review to reassure international investors, 
the IMF, and the World Bank that it was safe to invest money in South Korea.  
In addition, the Constitutional Court plays umpire between the president and 
the unicameral national legislature. 
Judicial review thus emerged and grew in South Korea for rights from 
wrongs, insurance and commitment, umpiring, and borrowing reasons. 
10.  Brazil 
Judicial review emerged in Brazil in its second constitution adopted in the 
1890s because the whole constitution was borrowed from the U.S. 
Constitution.  Brazil is a federal regime with weak states, and it also has a 
separation of legislative, executive, and judicial powers at the national level as 
well as separate constitutional status for municipalities as well as for the states.  
There thus has always been a need for a federalism and separation of powers 
umpire in Brazil. 
Brazil wrote its current constitution in 1988, and it went into effect in the 
early 1990s.  This constitution followed years of rights abusive military rule of 
the country, and there is a rights from wrongs aspect to the 1988 Brazilian 
Constitution, which has an unusually comprehensive bill of rights, which is 
judicially enforced by the Supreme Federal Tribunal, which is Brazil’s highest 
court.  The Supreme Federal Tribunal is both the head of a Diffuse U.S. model 
system of judicial review, and it is also a Kelsenian Constitutional Court with 
the power to bind actors in that civil law country with erga omnes rulings.  The 
Brazilian Supreme Federal Tribunal is very powerful and active and is a 
response to the wrongs committed by the military dictatorship. 
Judicial review in Brazil under the 1988 Constitution originated for rights 
from wrongs and borrowing reasons.  Brazil borrowed judicial review first 
from the U.S. in the 1890’s, and then from the German Kelsenian model.  The 
Supreme Federal Tribunal has been especially active in the last ten years, 
which I attribute to the fact that it faces no strong fused parliamentary 
government.  The division of power in Brazil between the president and the 
bicameral legislature and among the nation, the states, and the municipalities 
gives the Supreme Federal Tribunal a lot of scope within which to act.  
Extreme proportional legislation makes the lower house of the legislature 
unable to act at all.  The Supreme Federal Tribunal has plenty of political space 
within which it can act. 
11.  South Africa 
Judicial review originated in South Africa in 1994 when the peace 
negotiations between the African National Congress (ANC) and the white 
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apartheid government settled on the creation of a written constitution, with an 
ample bill of rights, and with a German-style Kelsenian Constitutional Court.  
The negotiators settled on agreeing on a long list of principles prior to the 
drafting of the South African constitution.  It was agreed astonishingly that the 
Constitutional Court would judicially review the final draft of the South 
African Constitution to make sure that it was in accord with the agreed upon 
constitutional principles.  The Court did so, found a few deviations from the 
agreed upon principles, and the Constitution was revised accordingly.  South 
Africa’s Kelsenian Constitutional Court is thus very powerful, and it is the 
only court ever to pass on the constitutionality of a constitution. 
The primary causes of the origins of judicial review in South Africa are two-
fold.  On the part of the ANC, the written constitution, the bill of rights, and 
the Constitutional Court were all created in response to the brutal, racist, 
totalitarian system of apartheid, which existed in South Africa from 1948 to 
1992.  For the ANC, which represented over 80% of South Africans, judicial 
review originated for rights from wrongs reasons and because of borrowing 
reasons.  Since the ANC had the power to ignore the white minority in South 
Africa, these reasons must be considered as the dominant reasons for the 
origination of judicial review in that country.  The ANC had favored a 
judicially enforceable Charter of Freedoms since 1955, and they finally got 
what they had been asking for all along in the 1990’s.  
For the white South African minority, judicial review originated, as 
Professor Ran Hirschl argues in Towards Juristocracy30 for fading elite 
hegemonic reasons.  White South Africans knew they would be only a small 
minority in the new South Africa so they were especially eager to create a bill 
of rights enforced by a powerful constitutional court.  Since the 1990s, the 
Constitutional Court has grown in power, since it moderates or plays umpire 
between the 80% of the country, which is African in origin and the white and 
mixed race minorities. 
Professor Ackerman describes South African constitutionalism as a product 
of a mass popular movement led by Nelson Mandela and the ANC.  I agree 
with that, and I think if Mandela had wanted to ignore the white minority and 
ride roughshod over them he could have gotten away with that after the end of 
the Cold War in 1992.  For whatever reason, that was not the course which 
Mandela chose to follow in constitutionalizing his own and the ANC’s 
charisma.  Mandela opted for a negotiated constitution and bill of rights with 
judicial review, which was acceptable to the white minority, and he even 
allowed the South African Constitutional Court to review for constitutionality 
the new South African Constitution.  This behavior sent a powerful signal to 
the IMF and the World Bank that South Africa was a safe place for global 
investors to invest in.   
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Judicial review in South Africa thus emerged for rights from wrongs 
reasons, and it has grown in power for umpiring reasons, and insurance and 
commitment reasons. 
12.  The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland 
The U.K. was historically wedded to the idea of parliamentary sovereignty 
and the Westminster model under which there was no bill of rights, no judicial 
review of the constitutionality of legislation since acts of parliament were acts 
of the sovereign, and which relied on the common law of England to protect 
liberty.  From the 1980s until 1997, there was a heated debate in the U.K. over 
whether to adopt a bill of rights and judicial review, and, in 1997, Tony Blair’s 
New Labor Party won a majority in the House of Commons on a platform, 
which pledged to give the U.K. a written bill of rights that was judicially 
enforceable.  This was accomplished by the Human Rights Act 1998, which 
came into effect in 2000. 
The Human Rights Act 1998, which is admirably described by Professor 
Stephen Gardbaum in The New Commonwealth Model of Constitutionalism: 
Theory and Practice (2013), incorporated into British law the European 
Convention on Human Rights, which is enforced by the European Court of 
Human Rights which sits in Strasbourg France and which has a very rights 
protective jurisprudence developed since the 1950s.  This treaty document thus 
became the U.K.’s written bill of rights.  The Human Rights Act 1998 provides 
in Section 3 that British courts shall construe British statutes and executive 
actions to be in accord with the European Convention on Human Rights, if it is 
plausible to do so.  The British courts have bent over backwards, as Professor 
Gardbaum explains, to construe British statutes to comply with the European 
Convention on Human Rights.  Section 4 of the Human Rights Act 1998 
provides that if a British statute cannot plausibly be construed to comply with 
the European Convention on Human Rights then British courts must issue a 
Declaration of Incompatibility, which triggers a fast track process in the House 
of Commons to pass new legislation to cure the incompatibility.  Parliament 
has to date cured every incompatibility found by the British courts except that 
it has not agreed to allow prisoners to vote as the European Court of Human 
Rights has held they can do.  Accordingly, Britain today does have a working 
system of judicial review of the constitutionality of Acts of Parliament. 
Judicial review emerged in the U.K. for borrowing reasons, because the 
U.K. was the only G-20 constitutional democracy, and the only common law 
country in the world, not to have a written bill of rights and judicial review, 
and British elites did not approve of this aspect of U.K. exceptionalism.  In 
addition, Britain had a bad record of losing human rights cases before the 
European Court of Human Rights, so there was a mild rights from wrongs 
reason as to why the U.K. finally opted for judicial review.  Finally, I think  
may be a third cause of the origination of judicial review in the U.K.  The 
recent Miller cases of 2017 and 2019 suggest that the Blair government’s 
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devolution of power to Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland, and the City of 
London has created a need for a federalism and separation of powers umpire.  
This in turn strengthens the need for a U.K. Supreme Court. 
In sum, the U.K. adopted a written bill of rights and a system of judicial 
review for borrowing, rights from wrongs, and umpiring reasons.  Canada and 
the U.K. show that rights from wrongs violations need not be as massive as 
those which gave rise to what Ackerman calls a revolution on a human scale in 
order to get judicial review going.  This is an important point, which I hope 
Ackerman will address in the next two books in his series. 
13.  Indonesia 
From its independence after the end of World War II until 1998, Indonesia 
had a presidential separation of powers constitution, but it was in practice a 
sometimes brutal presidential dictatorship.  Riots in 1998 brought democratic 
forces to power, and four critical constitutional amendments were adopted, 
which transformed Indonesia into a constitutional democracy with a 
Constitutional Court, federalism, and a greatly weakened presidency.  The 
Constitutional Court is a Kelsenian court borrowed from the South Korean and 
German Constitutions, and it has been very powerful and effective.  
Amendments have added a written Bill of Rights to the Indonesian 
Constitution, which the Constitutional Court enforces. 
Judicial review in Indonesia has been facilitated by the division and 
enumeration of power at the national level between the legislature, the term 
limited president, and the judiciary; and federalism with an enormous amount 
of decentralization of power in the amended Indonesian Constitution, all of 
which gives the Constitutional Court further room within which to maneuver.  
Indonesia’s Bill of Rights and system of judicial review emerged primarily for 
rights from wrongs reasons because Indonesia experienced severe human rights 
violations when it was a presidential dictatorship, which it wanted never to 
repeat.  Indonesia may also have opted for a written bill of rights and judicial 
review to encourage the IMF and the World Bank to favor international 
investment in the country.  Finally, different parties in the legislature may have 
favored a written Bill of Rights for insurance and commitment reasons of the 
kind Professor Tom Ginsburg writes about. 
Indonesia thus originated judicial review primarily for: 1) rights from 
wrongs reasons; 2) as a result of borrowing; and 3) because checks and 
balances left the Constitutional Court political space within which to act. 
14.  Mexico 
Mexico operates under a 1917 written constitution and bill of rights with a 
Supreme Court that has both the Diffuse U.S. powers of judicial review and 
also the Concentrated Kelsenian powers of judicial review of a constitutional 
court.  In this respect, it resembles the Brazilian model.  Mexico’s 1917 
Constitution created a federal presidential separation of powers model with a 
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bicameral legislature and a federal structure with power divided 
constitutionally among: the national government, the state governments, and 
the municipal governments.  However, until the year 2000, Mexico was run 
entirely by an authoritarian, dictatorial political party called the Institutional 
Revolutionary Party or PRI by its initials in Spanish.  As a result, Mexico’s 
separation of powers, federalism, and judicial review were meaningless prior 
to 2000 because the PRI held all of the levers of power, and it behaved like a 
presidential dictatorship.  The only limit on power that Mexico followed prior 
to 2000 was that its presidents served only one non-renewable six year term.  
Mexico prior to 2000 was an authoritarian oligarchy with an all powerful 
president. 
This began to change in the 1990s when PRI president, Ernesto Zedillo, 
started trying to democratize the country.  Real change came, however, with 
the 2000 presidential election, which was won by President Vincente Fox in an 
election which the PRI lost.  For the first time, Mexico had a president of one 
party and a bicameral legislature controlled by the PRI.  Since 2000, Mexico 
has elected mostly non-PRI presidents and many non-PRI governors, 
becoming therefore a true constitutional democracy.  Moreover, Mexico 
revamped its Supreme Court by cutting in half the number of justices and 
appointing to the Court independent-minded jurists who issue very progressive 
and independent decisions when exercising the power of judicial review.  
Mexico, today, has a real and independent system of judicial review of the 
constitutionality of legislation operating in an environment where power is 
decentralized by functional checks and balances. 
Independent judicial review originated in Mexico to impress the IMF and the 
World Bank and to encourage investment in that country; as a result of 
borrowing from the U.S., Brazil, and Germany; because of the need for an 
umpire in Mexico’s presidential separation of powers and federal system in 
which real power is reserved to the states and municipalities; and for what 
Professor Tom Ginsburg calls insurance and commitment reasons.  There was 
no Ackermanian mass popular movement, which led to the post 2000 growth 
of judicial review and the Supreme Court’s enforcement of Mexico’s 
previously meaningless written bill of rights. 
15.  The European Union 
Judicial review originated in the European Union entirely for federalism 
umpiring reasons.  In two landmark cases in the 1960s, the European Court of 
Justice (ECJ), which is the highest court in the European Union issued two 
fateful decisions, which were simply accepted by the political powers of the 
nation states over a long period of time, which stretched from 1970 until 1989, 
that made up the EU even though those decisions were in no way clearly 
provided for by the treaty which set up the EU.  First, the ECJ held that EU law 
had direct effect in the courts of the six nation states that then belonged to the 
EU.  This meant that the numerous national courts systems were in essence 
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drafted by the ECJ to enforce directly EU law in national courts.  This holding 
that EU law had direct effect in nation state courts was by no means obvious 
from reading the Treaty of Rome.  Often when a nation signs a treaty and 
violates it, the other nations to the treaty ask the political branches of the nation 
in violation to cure the violation.  The doctrine of direct effect skipped that step 
and said that national courts could themselves cure violations of EU law and 
could apply EU law.  This was a momentous decision once it was gradually 
accepted by the EU member nation courts. 
Second, the ECJ ruled shortly after adopting the doctrine of direct effect 
that, where there was a conflict between EU law and member nation state law, 
EU law was supreme and prevailed.  This was also a momentous decision once 
the EU member states accepted it, which they have still not completely done. 
This step transformed the EU from being constitutionally a treaty organization 
into being a confederation in which the ECJ was the Supreme Court and the 
courts of the nation states were its arms and legs in implementing supreme EU 
law.  In theory, EU law under this approach could even have trumped nation 
state constitutional law, although the Constitutional Courts of the nation states 
of Germany and Italy set limits on that process.  EU law trumps statutes 
enacted after the EU treaties, which is conclusive evidence of its constitutional 
status.  The net result is that there is today an unintended but real system of 
judicial review in the European Union that has grown up as a Hayekian 
spontaneous system of order to umpire federalism issues in the EU.31 
My colleague at Northwestern, Karen Alter, has studied the emergence of 
judicial review as a result of the need for a federalism umpire in Establishing 
the Supremacy of European Law: The Making of an International Rule of Law 
in Europe,32 and The European Court’s Political Power.33  The EU does have 
a fully functioning system of judicial review, which relies on the nation states 
courts acting under and accepting the supremacy of the ECJ on EU law 
matters.  This system of judicial review did not emerge out of: 1) a rights from 
wrongs process; 2) a desire for insurance and commitment; 3) borrowing; or 4) 
fading hegemonic elite entrenchment.  Judicial review in the EU emerged for 
one, and only for one reason, the need for a federalism umpire. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
I think that what is truly distinctive about the post-1945 experience of 
constitutionalism is not the written constitutionalization of charisma, which 
Professor Ackerman writes about, but is instead the written 
constitutionalization of judicial review of federal legislation, executive actions 
                                                 
 31. See FRIEDRICH HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION, AND LIBERTY, VOLUMES I, II, & III 
(1973). 
 32. KAREN ALTER, ESTABLISHING THE SUPREMACY OF EUROPEAN LAW: THE MAKING OF 
AN INTERNATIONAL RULE OF LAW IN EUROPE (2001). 
 33. KAREN ALTER, THE EUROPEAN COURT’S POLITICAL POWER (2010). 
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under written bills of rights, and of a Madisonian system of checks and 
balances.  Written constitutions existed from 1776 in the newly freed 
American states until 1945, and so “the rise of world constitutionalism” is not 
itself a new development.  What is distinctive about the post-1945 
constitutions is that they have actually worked because they have been 
accompanied by “the rise of global systems of checks and balances” and by 
“the rise of global judicial review.”   
 The French Revolutionaries both in 1791 and in 1848 were a mass popular 
movement, which constitutionalized its charisma in written constitutions.  
Those written constitutions, however, failed, just as Germany’s Weimar 
Constitution failed, because of a lack of checks and balances and because of 
the absence of judicial review.  Professor Ackerman does a beautiful job of 
describing the mass popular movements, which are discussed in Revolutionary 
Constitutions: Charismatic Leadership and the Rule of Law, but he fails to 
note the reasons why the post-1945 constitutions have mostly succeeded 
whereas the pre-1945 constitutions mostly failed.  Between 1945 and 2021, the 
common law world rejected the Westminster Model in favor of the U.S. Model 
of judicial review, and the civil law world rejected France’s historical 
disapproval of judicial review in favor of the German Model of judicial review, 
which is now triumphant in all civil law nations, including France. 
